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Abstract
In this dissertation, I oer three independent studies. The rst examines the impact
of foreign direct investment (FDI) on entrepreneurial activities over the period 1996-2008.
We nd that FDI has no discernible eect on entrepreneurial activity in probusiness states
identied by the existence of Right-to-Work (RTW) states. In non-RTW states, however,
we nd that an increase in FDI decreases the average monthly rate of business creation and
destruction.
The second study assesses the impact of breastfeeding on early childhood outcomes.
Using Birth Cohort of Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS-b) data and employing
a recently developed econometric technique, I estimate the upper and lower bounds of the
eect of breastfeeding on early childhood health and cognitive ability. I nd that even a
small fraction of selection on unobservables explains the full eect of breastfeeding on early
childhood outcomes.
The third study evaluates the eect of Ban-the-Box (BTB) policy on recidivism. BTB
policies restrict employers from conducting background checks on employment applications
and delay them until interviews are completed. I examine if BTB policies prevent ex-oenders
from returning to prison. Using the National Correctional Reporting Program 2000-2014
dataset in a dierences-in-dierences framework, I nd that BTB policies reduce one-year
rates of recidivism. I also observe a large reduction in recidivism for black males in BTB
counties but do not detect any evidence for females. Finally, I nd that employment




This dissertation presents three independent manuscripts focusing on U.S. society. Chapter
2 explores the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on entrepreneurial activities at the
individual-owners level during the period 1996-2008. I investigate the dierential eect of
FDI in pro- and non pro-business states distinguished by Right-to-Work (RTW) and non
RTW status. Chapter 3 examines the causal impact of breastfeeding on early childhood
outcomes. I use Altonji, Elder, and Taber's (2005) econometric approach to test sensitivity
of the eect of breastfeeding. Chapter 4 estimates the eect of Ban-the-Box (BTB) policy on
recidivism. Under the parallel trend assumption, my dierence-in-dierences (DID) estimate
identies the causal eect of BTB. Chapter 5 discusses my ndings and concludes.
1.1 Eects of FDI on Entrepreneurial Activity: Evidence from US States.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been owing into the United States and a number of
foreign companies in operation employ millions of Americans whose parents were formerly
small business owners. Americans identify as independent, self-sustaining, and entrepreneurial,
so it is interesting to ask: how would Americans respond to a massive inow of FDI over
the last half a century? Would they change their responses to alternative job opportunities
created by foreign companies under the pro- and non pro-business environments? Existing
theoretical studies yield mixed predictions (Grossman, 1984: Rodriguez-Clare, 1996: Markusen
and Venables, 1999). Hence, an answer to this question depends on empirical evidence. We
address these questions by using a variety of available public data.
We have two empirical challenges in identifying the causal eect of FDI. The rst
challenge is lack of universal metrics for entrepreneurial activity, particularly at the individual-
owner level. To address this issue, we employ the Kauman Index of Entrepreneurship micro
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dataset, which measures the ow of business creation (Fairlie, 2014). In addition, referring
to Fairlie's (2014) denition of business creation, we create rate of business destruction using
Current Population Survey dataset. The second challenge is a potential association between
unobserved state characteristics simultaneously inuencing entrepreneurial activities and
FDI. To partial out state characteristics and macroeconomic factors, we control for state
and year xed eects. Furthermore, we control for state-specic linear time trends to adjust
for trends aecting entrepreneurial activities. As long as the unobserved characteristics
associated with entrepreneurial activity would remain constant from a state's trend when
FDI varied from trend, we can identify the reliable estimate of FDI on entrepreneurial
activities.
We do not detect discernible evidence that FDI aects business creation and destruction
rates for contagious U.S. during 1996-2008. However, we nd negative eects of FDI on
business creation and destruction in non pro-business states, separating RTW and non-RTW
states - proxies for pro- and non pro-business environments. With certain tests, our results
are robust.
The most plausible explanation is a dierence in the expected opportunity cost of starting
up business. Non RTW states are characterized by an inexible labor market and high
wage rates. Higher FDI creates more wage jobs with better job security. Workers in non
RTW states are induced to select these jobs over starting up businesses. Consequently,
the pool of entrepreneurs in non-RTW states shrinks, reducing competition among existing
entrepreneurs. This lowers the rate of business destruction in non RTW states.
1.2 Breastfeeding and Early Childhood Outcomes: Is There a Causal Relationship?
This research topic originates from my personal experience. A few months prior to our
son's delivery, my wife stated that breastfeeding would be generally benecial in our child's
development but also would require substantial amount of time. I knew that breastfeeding
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was benecial in developing countries due to the inferior hygiene and underdeveloped social
infrastructure, but had no idea what would be the causal eects of breastfeeding on early
childhood outcomes in the United States.
Supported by federal agencies and non-prot organizations promoting breastfeeding, the
incidence of breastfeeding has been steadily increasing over the last three decades in the
United States. However, the basis for a causal mechanism is arguably weak because the
empirical conclusion is mostly inferred from observed variation in breastfeeding incidence
collected by a large-scale survey. The lack of evidence supported by experimental and quasi-
experimental approaches questions if the positive eects of breastfeeding are causal.
I have two objectives in my second chapter. Using Early Child Longitudinal Survey of
Birth Cohort (ECLS-B), I examine if we observe positive associations between breastfeeding
and early childhood outcomes. Next, I conduct a sensitivity check developed by Altonji et
al. (2005) under the assumption of equality of observables and unobservables.
I nd the results consistent with those of the observational studies. The estimates
of breastfeeding from regressions are mostly signicant and positive on early childhood
outcomes. My sensitivity analysis, however, show that the lower bound of the eect of
breastfeeding is not dierent from zero at the conventional level and even negative for some
outcomes. I further conrm that only 10 percent of unobserved characteristics relative to
observed characteristics is sucient to account for the positive eect of breastfeeding on
early childhood outcomes.
1.3 Ban the Box and Recidivism.
Many Americans have past criminal histories and 650,000 ex-oenders are returning to
society from federal and state prisons every year. Most job application forms in the United
States ask if an applicant has been convicted of a crime and, if the box for yes has been
ticked, the application tends to be discarded at the initial screening stage. Ban-the-Box
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(BTB) policies restrict employers from asking about applicants' criminal histories on job
applications and delay background checks until interviews are completed. Recent studies
on BTB policy have focused on its eect on labor market outcomes, particularly statistical
discrimination. However, there are few studies investigating the eect of BTB policy on
rates of recidivism.
I estimate the eect of BTB policy for oenders recently released using the National
Correctional Reporting Program (NCRP) 2000-2014 dataset (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2016). NCRP data is a rich panel dataset of prison terms for the same oender, and also
contains information on the county where the sentence was imposed. Under the assumption
that the county of an oender's sentence is the county where he/she resides upon release
from prison, I aggregate a dataset of millions of rst-sentence ex-oenders to create recidivism
variable, rates of recidivism at the year-county level. I then assign adoption of BTB policy to
counties across time. I align our research samples with the two age groups on which existing
studies focused, age 18-65 (working-age) and age 25-34 (young) oenders.
I employ a dierence-in-dierences (DID) approach to identify the eect of BTB on
one-year rates of recidivism. As long as that the average rate of recidivism in BTB counties
would evolve similarly in non-BTB counties over the sample period with no BTB policy, my
empirical model captures the causal eects of BTB. I test the validity of my identication
assumption by estimating a main specication augmented with leads and lags of BTB
adoption.
I nd a large and signicant eect of BTB on recidivism. The estimated eects relative
to the pre-adoption means are a 29% reduction for working-age ex-oenders and a 24%
reduction for young ex-oenders. My results also indicate that the eect of BTB policy
grows substantially over time upon its adoption: The reduction grows from 3.4 percentage
points in the rst BTB post-adoption year to 7.4-8.1 percentage points in the following years.
Further examination on heterogeneous eects reveals that BTB policies disproportionately
prevent Black male ex-oenders from returning to prison but benet little female ex-oenders
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or young ex-oenders in highly educated counties. In a labor market analysis, we nd
that, as Doleac and Hansen (2016) report, BTB laws induce employers to statistically
discriminate against Blacks in the working age and young populations. We also nd that
employment opportunities in industries which employ more ex-oenders are complement
with BTB policies to prevent ex-oenders from returning to prison: The estimated eect in
the post-BTB counties is a 3.1% reduction in recidivism for young ex-oenders.
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Chapter 2. Eects of FDI on Entrepreneurial
Activity: Evidence from US States
2.1 Introduction
Technological progress coupled with reductions in trade and investment barriers observed
over the last decades have dramatically intensied Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) around
the globe. The share of FDI in the world GDP steadily rose from about 0.5 percent in 1980 to
about 2.6 percent in 2013 (World Development Indicators, 2015). The growing importance of
FDI has also kindled a debate over its implications for economic growth, labor markets, and
domestic entrepreneurial activity. The existing literature has extensively investigated the
impact of FDI on growth, labor-market outcomes, and technology transfer (Alfaro, 2014).
The relationship between FDI and entrepreneurial activity, however, has attracted little
attention. Given that many academics and policy makers view entrepreneurial dynamism
as a spur to innovation and growth, a route out of poverty and labor market discrimination,
absence of a detailed and robust empirical analysis seems surprising.1
Existing literature on the interactions between FDI and entrepreneurial activity has been
largely theoretical, and the conclusion from these studies is mixed. The model developed in
Grossman 1984 predicts that the inow of foreign rms crowds out local entrepreneurship
because higher earnings prospects in foreign rms induce individuals to choose waged employment.
Rodriguez-Clare (1996) proposes a model relating foreign rms with domestic intermediate-
good producers through linkages. His model predicts a positive impact of FDI on entrepreneurship
when linkages are strong. Markusen and Venables (1999) also reach a similar conclusion.
1For example, Haltiwanger et al. (2013) nd that small-business start-ups created about 3.5 million net
new jobs in the U.S. private sector in 2005. See also Aghion et al. 2014, Hout and Rosen 2000, Fairlie and
Robb 2008 and Hunt 2011 for a detailed discussion of entrepreneurial dynamism and its role in the economy.
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On empirical side, there are a few notable studies. Barrios et al. (2005), for example,
nd that FDI has a positive net impact on the creation of local rms in Ireland. Danakol
et al. (2014), using business creation rates data across 70 countries over the 20002009
period, nd a negative eect of FDI on entrepreneurship. Results from the aforementioned
theoretical models coupled with limited empirical evidence call for a detailed investigation
of the relationship between FDI and entrepreneurial activity.
In this paper, we examine the impact of FDI on entrepreneurship at the individual-
owner level in US states over 1996-2008. In doing so, we investigate how the impact diers
across states with respect to their right-to-work (RTW) status, a convenient proxy pertaining
to states' business climate (Holmes, 1998). In its simplest form, a RTW law states that
employees have the right to work without being forced to join to a union. These laws are
also associated with several other business friendly policies including but not limited to lower
hiring and ring regulations, lax environmental protection, and lower taxes (Holmes, 1998).
As discussed further below, dierences in the local labor-market conditions (e.g., average
wages, labor market exibility) across these two types of states may aect the opportunity
cost of doing entrepreneurial activity.
There are two main empirical challenges to estimating the causal eect of FDI on business
creation and destruction. First, the identication of entrepreneurial activity at any level
is a dicult task. The main problem stems from the distinction between employer and
non-employer rms. For example, Business Employment Dynamics (complied by the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics) focuses only on the former and measures entrepreneurial activity
by employer establishment birth and death rates. However, employer-based counts represent
only a small share of all entrepreneurial activity (Fairlie, 2014). In this paper, we use
Fairlie's (2014) Kauman Entrepreneurship micro-data les, which cover both employer and
non-employer rms. More precisely, we measure entrepreneurial activity at the individual-
owner level as the average monthly rate of non-business owners becoming entrepreneurs
(business creation rate), and as the average monthly rate of entrepreneurs exiting from
business ownership (business destruction rate).
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Second, unobserved variables that may aect the level of FDI may also be correlated
with entrepreneurial activity. As such, in order to identify the causal eect, it is imperative
to consider arguably exogenous variation in the ow of FDI. Our empirical analysis uses
state-level data and our estimates are based on regression specications that control for state
level xed eects, state-specic time trends, and year xed eects. Under the assumption
that unobservable variables related to entrepreneurial activity do not deviate from a state's
trend when FDI deviates from trend, we can uncover the causal eect of FDI on business
creation and destruction. Falsication tests presented throughout the text provide supportive
evidence for the validity of our identifying assumption.
Using data from several sources over the 1996-2008 period, we reach the following empirical
conclusions. The results from the full sample indicate a negative but barely signicant eect
of FDI on average monthly business creation and destruction rates. When we restrict the
sample to RTW states, we do not observe any eects of FDI on entrepreneurial activity.
In non-RTW states, however, an increase in FDI signicantly decreases both the business
creation and destruction rates. Specically, we nd that a 10 percent increase in FDI
decreases average monthly rate of business creation and destruction by roughly 4 and 2.5
percent (relative to sample mean), respectively. Our estimates further imply that the net
impact of FDI on entrepreneurial activity in non-RTW states is positive. For example,
using population numbers from the 2010 CPS-ORG, we show that a 10 percent increase in
FDI let about 17,500 entrepreneurs stay in business. We carefully examine several potential
explanations that may drive the results, and nd that an explanation related to dierences
in the opportunity costs of occupational choices in RTW and non-RTW states is more
convincing. Several robustness checks support the baseline results of the paper.
This paper is related to a large literature on entrepreneurship. Several studies have
analyzed the determinants of business formation.2 We contribute to this literature by
2Among many others, see Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), Blanchower and Oswald (1998), Fairlie (1999),
Hout and Rosen (2000), Cullen and Gordon (2007), Hall and Woodward (2010), and Dinopoulos and Unel
(2015).
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examining the existence of a causal link between FDI and entrepreneurship. This paper
also relates to a large empirical literature on FDI and its eects on economic outcomes.3
We show that the eect of FDI on entrepreneurial activity depends on local labor market
conditions. Finally, this paper complements the literature on RTW laws and their role in
state economies.4 Our ndings may shed light on legislative decisions in states where the
debate over RTW laws is currently intense (e.g., West Virginia).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews RTW laws and
compares main economic characteristics across states. Section 3 discusses the data and
Section 4 describes the details of the econometric methodology used in the paper. Section 5
presents the results, provides a discussion of potential channels leading to our ndings, and
presents several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Right-to-Work Laws
In 1935, with the passage of the Wagner Act, the U.S. Congress granted organized labor
statutory sanction to re employees for refusal to join a union. The law gave rise to a
movement to curb the additional power bestowed upon unions at the state level. The 1947
Taft-Hartley amendments to the 1935 Wagner Act granted states the power to ban the union
shop (the so-called Right-to-Work laws), a contract provision that requires all employees to
join and pay dues to the union. By the time of the Taft-Hartley Act, ve states had already
passed such laws (Arkansas and Florida in 1944, and Arizona, Nebraska and South Dakota
in 1946). Since then and until the most recent cases of Indiana and Michigan in 2012 and
Wisconsin in 2015, twenty-two states have passed RTW laws.5
3This literature is vast, see Yeaple (2013) and Alfaro (2014) for comprehensive reviews.
4See, for example, Hirsch (1980), Ellwood and Fine (1987), Holmes (1998), Farber (2005), and Eren and
Ozbeklik (2016).
5These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
9
RTW states are perceived as pro-business because of their attitudes towards labor unions
as well as their other business friendly policies such as lax environmental regulations and
lower taxes (Holmes, 1998). There are striking dierences between RTW and non-RTW
states in terms of economic progress. For example, relative to non-RTW states, RTW
states annually grew by 0.6 percentage points faster over the last three decades. RTW
states have also generated higher growth in employment, and have generally experienced
lower unemployment rate.6 Holmes (1998) shows that, on average, manufacturing activity
(measured by its share of total employment) increases abruptly by about one-third when one
crosses the border from a non-RTW state to a RTW state.
Particularly important for our study are the labor market exibility and wage structures
(which together determine the opportunity cost of becoming an entrepreneur) that prevailed
in RTW and non-RTW states. Figure 1 displays the average-market exibility index over
our sample analysis period (1996-2008) and it measures the intensity of hiring and ring
regulations, centralized collective bargaining, minimum wages, working hours regulations,
etc. (Stansel et al., 2015). Higher values of the index indicate more exible labor markets;
as such, labor markets have always been more exible in RTW states.
Figure 2 plots the real hourly wages (in 2009 dollars) over the same period obtained
from micro-level data (Current Population Survey les) after having purged out the eects
of individual characteristics (i.e., age, race, gender and educational attainment) and time.7
As shown in the gure, average wages have always been higher in non-RTW states. Among
several other factors, stronger labor unions and more rigid local labor market conditions
arguably have played an important role in these wage dierentials (Holmes, 1998; Eren and
Ozbeklik, 2016).8
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Figure A.1 in the appendix shows all RTW states and the
years these laws were enacted.
6These statistics are obtained using data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and Current
Population Survey monthly les.
7Raw data trends are very similar to those presented in the text and are available upon request.
8See also Hirsch (1980), Ellwood and Fine (1987) and Farber (2005) for detailed investigation of RTW
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this study are taken from several publicly available sources covering a time
span from 1996 to 2008. Entrepreneurial activity is measured by (i) the rate of business
creation, and (ii) the rate of business destruction, both of which are at the individual-
owner level. The data for business creation are drawn from Fairlie's (2014) Kauman
Entrepreneurship Micro-Data Files (1996 and onwards), which are constructed using the
Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) monthly les.9 The data
for each year covers more than 650,000 observations from the U.S. adult population ages
20 to 64 years old and includes basic demographic information (i.e., gender, race and age),
educational background, and labor market information (i.e., employment status, worker
class, hours worked per week, etc.).
Self-employed individuals who own a business as their main job and work at least 15
hours per week are considered entrepreneurs in the CPS-ORG data.10 To identify business
creation (or destruction) at the individual-owner level, individuals must be tracked over time.
The CPS is a household survey and unfortunately it does not include individual identiers.
However, respondents in the CPS-ORG data are surveyed on a monthly basis for four
consecutive months.11 Exploiting this feature of the data, Fairlie (2014) matches individuals
over two consecutive months using information on household ID, household number, record
lines, survey month, sex, race, and age.12 He then identies new entrepreneurs as those
individuals who do not own a business as their main job in one survey month but become
a business owner in the subsequent month. In a similar fashion, we also identify exiting
laws and state economies.
9Due to revisions in the household identiers implemented to protect the condentiality of survey
respondents, a matching algorithm cannot be performed to several earlier years (e.g., 1985, 1994 and 1995)
of the CPS-ORG data (Madrian and Lefgren, 1999; Fairlie, 2014).
10Individuals with imputed information on worker class (i.e., self-employed or not) and hours of work are
excluded. The results presented in the paper remain unchanged if we do not exclude imputed observations
(which constitutes less than 3.5 percent of the eective sample).
11Each household is resurveyed for another four consecutive months a year later and then leaves the sample
permanently.
12The success rate of this matching procedure from 1996 and onwards is roughly 95 percent (Fairlie,2014).
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entrepreneurs as those individuals who are entrepreneurs in one survey month but become
a non-business owner in the next month.
For each state and year, we then calculate the average business creation rate as the
weighted monthly fraction of non-business owners who created new businesses, and the
average business destruction rate as the weighted monthly fraction of entrepreneurs who
became non-business owners. In all calculations CPS weights are used. It is important to
emphasize that we are able to replicate the business creation rate, the so-called Kaufmann
Entrepreneurial Activity Index reported in Fairlie (2014). Our ability to precisely replicate
Kauman Entrepreneurial Activity Index for each year and state provides validity to our
construction of the business destruction index. Finally, we do not distinguish between
the creation of high-growth potential businesses (i.e., opportunity entrepreneurship) and
individuals starting businesses because of limited job opportunities (i.e., necessity entrepreneurship)
in our construction of a business creation index. Dropping new entrepreneurs coming out
of unemployment and limiting our attention to only opportunity entrepreneurship do not
aect the estimated eects presented throughout the text. All these results are available
upon request.
Table 1 reports the basic summary statistics of entrepreneurial activity for all states
(Column 1) and by RTW status (Columns 2 and 3, respectively) over the sample period.13
The rst row presents the average number of entrepreneurs per 1,000 adults, and note that
roughly more than 8 percent of the adult population is entrepreneurs. Looking at the second
row of Table 1, we see that the average monthly rate of business creation per 1,000 non-
business owners is 3 adults (0.3 percent). This fraction is slightly higher in the RTW states.
Specically, 3.1 and 2.8 adults out of 1,000 non-business owners created new businesses
each month in the RTW and non-RTW states, respectively. We also see that about 80 out
of 1,000 entrepreneurs (8 percent) shut down their businesses each month over the sample
period (Row 3, Table 1).14
13States enacting RTW laws after 2008 are considered as non-RTW states in the data.
14One might wonder why we do not dierentiate between high-growth and individual business. The rate of
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Figure 3.a displays the data trends in the average monthly rate of business creation from
1996 to 2008. We do not observe any discernible patterns in trends across states. That being
said, the average business creation rate is almost always higher in RTW states than that
in non-RTW states. Turning to time series for business destruction, we observe an upward
trend in these rates (Figure 3.b). As such, the average business destruction rate increased
more than 30 percent from 1996 to 2008 for both RTW and non-RTW states.15
Annual data on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inows come from the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA), and cover the nancial structure and operations of non-bank
U.S. aliates of foreign direct investors.16 FDI data are measured by the total value of
foreign investment in property, plant, and equipment, and are available at state level over
the 19772007 period. We use state-level GDP deators (from the BEA) to convert nominal
values into millions of chained 2009 dollars.17 The last row of Table 1 presents the basic
summary measures and Figure 4 displays the log average real FDI separately for RTW and
non-RTW states. FDI inows exhibit similar trends across the states and it is interesting
to note that non-RTW states attracted more FDI than RTW states.18 Unfortunately, as we
discuss further below, FDI data on several sub-sectors are not available for a large number
of states and there is also not a uniform industry level classication of FDI over our sample
period. We can only consistently disaggregate total FDI into two parts as manufacturing
and non-manufacturing FDI. Based on this crude classication, perhaps suprisingly, the
business creation is measured at the individual-owner level using Current Population Survey, so separating
high-growth business including computer software industries and individual business is infeasible. See Fairlie
(2014) for more details.
15We calculated entrepreneurial activity up to 2013. The average business creation rate shows a sharp
decline beginning in mid-2009 for both RTW and non-RTW states. The average business destruction rate has
been somewhat stable for RTW states from 2009 and onwards, while it showed a reversal trend in non-RTW
states following the years after the Great Recession.
16A U.S. aliate is a business enterprise in which foreign investors have 10 percent or more of the voting
securities or an equivalent interest.
17The results of the paper remain the same if we instead use the aggregate price index for xed non-
residential investment to convert nominal values into real terms.
18The sharp decline in FDI observed between 2000 and 2002 mainly reects the 2000 stock market crash
and the recession following it. During our sample period, California and New York are the top two non-RTW
states that attracted most of the FDI, while Texas was ranked the top across RTW states.
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fraction of manufacturing FDI is somewhat similar (48 and 43 percent of total FDI are in
manufacturing sector) in RTW and non-RTW states, respectively.
In some of the estimations reported below, we also control for a variety of time-variant
state characteristics obtained from various sources. Specically, our regression specications
control for log real gross domestic product, log population, unemployment rate, real minimum
wage, and lag value of percent of adult population that were self-employed. State economic
variables are obtained from the BEA, while the fraction of entrepreneurs comes from Fairlie
(2014). We also include the percent of the state's adult population that are white, male, and
college graduates, as well as the private sector unionization rates, all of which are extracted
from CPS-ORG les. Finally, a composite-tax index from Stansel et al. (2015) is added
to our specications. The index measures the intensity of takings and discriminatory taxes
at the state level constructed from data on tax revenue as a percentage of state GDP, top
marginal income tax rate, indirect tax revenue as a percentage of state GDP, and sales taxes
collected as a percentage of state GDP.19
2.4 Empirical Methodology





βjFDIst−j + αt + αs + αst+X
′
stλ+ εst (2.1)
where Est is the the rate of business creation or destruction (i.e., entrepreneurial activity)
expressed per 1,000 adults in state s and year t, FDIst−j denotes lag values (up to two lags) of
log FDI, αt are year xed eects to capture changes occurring across all states, αs are state
19Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for the 1978-1993 period, Gentry and Hubbard (2000)
estimate the eects of tax system on the likelihood of becoming self-employed. They nd that progressive
marginal tax rates discourage entry into self-employment and business ownership. In another study, Desai
et al. (2011) investigate the extent to which tax deferral policies aect U.S. direct investment abroad, and
nd that, over the 19822010 period, these policies made foreign investment dynamically inecient.
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xed eects to control for time-invariant state characteristics, αst are state-specic time
trends to control for linearly trending state characteristics, Xst is the set of time-varying
control variables and εst is the error term. We opt out of using contemporaneous FDI
to circumvent concerns stemming from reverse causality. Besides, FDI may take time to
manifest itself. Employing dierent functional forms such as using FDI per capita rather
than total FDI has no signicant impact on the point estimates reported throughout the
paper.
The key identifying assumption underlying this framework is that unobservable variables
that are related to the outcome do not deviate from a state's trend when its lagged FDI
deviates from trend. Under this assumption, the coecient estimates of βjs can be interpreted
as the causal impact of FDI on entrepreneurial activity. We provide several sensitivity checks
(e.g., falsication test) throughout the text regarding the validity of this assumption.
To minimize any potential contamination in inference procedure that may arise due to a
small number of clusters (22 RTW and 28 non-RTW states), we obtain p−values associated
with test of signicance for each coecient estimate using the wild bootstrap t-procedure
clustered at the state level (Cameron et al., cgm2008).
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Baseline Results
We report the eects of FDI on the average monthly business creation rate in Table 2. We
present the results for all states and by RTW status of the states. Columns 1-3 provide the
results by only including state and year xed eects and state-specic time trends, while
Columns 4-6 report the results by adding time-variant state controls. In Columns 1 and 4,
we report the eects of FDI using only lag one, while we use lag two in Columns 2 and 5,
and nally, we include lag one and two at the same time in Columns 3 and 6. The p−values
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obtained from 999 wild bootstrap repetitions clustered at the state level are reported beneath
each coecient estimate.
Focusing rst on all states, we do not nd any strong eect of FDI on business creation
rate (Panel A, Table 2). The reported coecients are all negative but they are not dierent
from zero at the 5 percent level. Similar to full sample results, we continue to observe no eect
of FDI in RTW states with generally positive point estimates (Panel B). As for non-RTW
states, however, the coecients (in absolute value) are considerably larger in magnitude
and the estimate on lag two is highly signicant (Column 2, Panel C). The eect size is
-1.1, which implies that a 10 percent increase in FDI decreases the average monthly rate of
business creation by 4 percent, relative to its sample mean. Including both lags has virtually
no impact on the estimated eects (Column 3).
Columns 4-6 provide the same set of estimates but this time additionally including all
the time-variant state characteristics described in Section 3. Note that the point estimates
are very similar in magnitude to those reported in Columns 1-3. The insensitivity of our
coecient estimates to the inclusion of a relatively rich set of covariates provides some
assurance to our identifying assumption.
Our next set of results pertain to average monthly rate of business destruction. Table
3 presents the estimated eects of FDI. We do not observe any impact of FDI on business
destruction when we consider all states (Panel A) or only RTW states (Panel B). Turning to
non-RTW states, however, we once again observe statistically signicant and non-negligible
eects of FDI. It appears that both the rst and second lags are precisely estimated when
entered one at a time, while it is only the rst lag of FDI that yields a statistically signicant
coecient estimate when we add them at the same time to the model specication. The eect
size from lag one is -19.968 (Column 3, Panel C, Table 3). This implies that a 10 percent
increase in FDI decreases the average monthly rate of business destruction by roughly 2.5
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percent, relative to its sample mean. Controlling for state characteristics has little eect on
the estimated eects of FDI on business destruction (Columns 4-6).
Combining the estimates of the eects of FDI from average monthly business creation
and destruction specications in non-RTW states, our calculations imply that the net impact
of FDI on the level of entrepreneurial activity is positive. To see this, let Pt denote the adult
population (in 1,000) of non-RTW states in period t, and et the fraction of entrepreneurs
in the population. Using our estimates, a 10 percent increase in FDI decreases the number
of businesses created and the number of business destroyed by 1.1(1 − et)Pt and 20etPt,
respectively. The net eect of FDI on entrepreneurial activity then is 20etPt−1.1(1−et)Pt =
(21.1et − 1.1)Pt, and note that this eect is always positive as long as et > 0.052. That
is, an increase in FDI has a net positive impact on the level of entrepreneurial activity if
entrepreneurs constitute at least 5.2 percent of the adult population in non-RTW states.
The average share of entrepreneurs in non-RTW states is always above 8 percent (see the
rst row in Table 1).
For example, using data on business and non-business owners population from the 2010
CPS-ORG, we nd that a 10 percent increase in FDI translates into roughly 10,500 fewer
businesses created and 13,000 fewer business destroyed each month during the year.20 Consequently,
a 10 percent increase in FDI saved about 17,500 entrepreneurs in non-RTW states during
2010.21
It is important to emphasize that FDI reduced both business creation and destruction
rates in non-RTW states, which might have undesirable economic consequences in these
states. Lower business creation may slow down innovation, growth, and job creation driven
20The business and non-business owner populations in non-RTW states in 2010 were roughly 93.5 and 6.5
million, respectively. Multiplying these population numbers with the corresponding estimated eects of FDI
(Column 3 of Panel C in Tables 2 and 3), we obtained the monthly estimates.
21As noted in Fairlie (2014), annual estimates are not twelve times monthly estimates because individuals
can potentially become entrepreneurs multiple times within the same year. He suggests that annual rates
are about 6 to 8 times monthly ones. In our calculation of the number of entrepreneurs saved during 2010,
we multiply the average number of entrepreneurs saved each month (2,500) by 7.
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by new entrepreneurs, and lower business destruction may induce inecient entrepreneurs
to stay in the market.
2.5.2 Potential Channels
Stepping back and viewing the complete set of results, we have two main ndings. First, there
is no eect of FDI on entrepreneurial activity at the individual-owner level in RTW states.
Second, our results indicate that an increase in FDI in non-RTW states decreases the average
monthly business creation and destruction rates. In this section, partly borrowing from
various theoretical models, we shall try to explain the mechanism underlying our ndings.
One potential explanation pertains to market stealing eects, which may stem from an
increase in product market competition.22 Foreign rms, on average, are larger and more
productive than domestic rms, and thus can strategically charge lower prices which in turn
potentially deter new startups.23 This explanation is not entirely convincing on two accounts.
First, more intense product market competition should also lead to displacement of existing
entrepreneurs. However, we do not see such a pattern. Second, given the pro-business nature
of RTW states, one would expect at least similar eects in RTW states as well.
Another potential explanation is related to the dierences in composition of FDI across
states. It is conceivable to argue that RTW states predominantly attract FDI where the
nature of inows are not highly correlated with business activity at the individual level. In
this case, it may not be surprising to observe a null eect of aggregate FDI on business
creation and destruction in RTW states. To further explore this hypothesis, we disaggregate
total FDI into two parts: manufacturing FDI (FDIm) and non-manufacturing FDI (FDIo).
Our choice of disaggregation is driven by data restrictions, and given that manufacturing
22Tirole (1988) reviews various strategic actions (such as capacity expansion, advertising, learning-by-
doing, etc.) through which rms aect competitive conditions and deter entry into markets.
23In an inuential paper, Helpman et al. (2004), using U.S. exports and aliate sales data that cover 52
manufacturing sectors and 38 countries, show that only the most productive rms engage in FDI activity.
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FDI plays a more important role in RTW states (48 and 43 percent of total FDI in RTW
and non-RTW states, respectively), our crude disaggregation may still provide insights.24 As
such, if our results are driven by dierences in composition, one would expect similar eects
of manufacturing FDI on entrepreneurial activity across these states. Table 4 reports the
results from a slightly modied version of equation (1) where we include manufacturing and
non-manufacturing FDI separately. The points estimates on manufacturing FDI for RTW
states continue to be imprecisely estimated (Panel A), whereas the estimated eects for
non-RTW states are consonant with those presented from Tables 2 and 3 (Panel B). Taking
this analysis one step further and excluding states where the nature of manufacturing FDI is
potentially dierent than the rest of the nation (California, New York, and Massachusetts)
does not alter the ndings (Columns 3 and 4).
A more plausible and convincing explanation for our results comes from a mechanism
operating through dierences in local labor market conditions in RTW and non-RTW states,
and thereby in the opportunity costs associated with dierent occupational choices (Lucas,
1978; Kihlstrom and Laont, 1979). Recall that labor markets are less exible and average
wages are always higher in non-RTW states (Figures 1 and 2). The extent of job security
coupled with better average pay implies higher expected opportunity cost for an agent to
choose entrepreneurship over wage work. FDI inows create new job opportunities for
individuals, and these jobs pay higher wages and provide more job security in non-RTW
states, which in turn may induce individuals (risk-averse ones in particular) to become
employees. Lower rates of business destruction following FDI would then be a natural
extension of this explanation. Decreased supply of small-business owners alleviates the
competitive pressure on existing ones and lowers their exit from the market.
To further explore this potential channel, we replace our entrepreneurial activity measures
from all sectors with the rate of business creation and destruction occurring in only the
manufacturing sector. Under our proposed explanation, one would expect an FDI driven
24FDI data on several sub-sectors are not available for a large number of states and there is also not a
uniform industry level classication of FDI over our sample period.
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decrease in the business creation rate also lowers the business destruction rate. This is
indeed what we observe in the data. The point estimates for the rst and second lags
of FDI on business creation rate in manufacturing sector are negative but less precisely
estimated, -1.61 (p−value=0.14) and -1.54 (p−value=0.60) in non-RTW states, respectively.
The corresponding estimates on the rate of average monthly business destruction are -54.64
(p−value=0.05) and 20.16 (p−value=0.23), respectively.25 We continue to observe null eects
in RTW states.
Our proposed explanation is consonant with recent empirical studies that analyze relation
among risk, wage, and entrepreneurship. For example, using data on US companies receiving
venture funding between 1987 and 2008, Hall and Woodward (2010) compare the dierence
between cash rewards that entrepreneurs actually received with the cash that they would
have received from a risk free waged job. They nd that a venture-backed entrepreneur
has a below-market salary and about 75 percent of them receive nothing at exit. Given
this nature of entrepreneurship, individuals associated with relatively lower risk aversion
and higher initial assets generally become entrepreneurs. A higher risk-free payo (wages) in
non-RTW states may induce more individuals to become wage workers rather than becoming
entrepreneurs and facing an uncertain payo.26
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
We implement several sensitivity checks to examine the validity of our results. Tables 5
and 6 present these additional estimates of the eects of FDI for average monthly rate of
business creation and destruction, respectively. First, we additionally control for quadratic
state-specic time trends in the specications. The results from this exercise are reported
25Our estimates based on non-manufacturing sector are qualitatively similar to the above results.
26Several other empirical studies examine the relationship between risk and the supply of entrepreneurs.
For example, Olds (2014) nds that the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) increased
incorporated self-employment by 31%. He attributes the surge in self-employment to reduced risk within the
household following SCHIP availability.
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in the rst column of Tables 5 and 6. The point estimates are very similar to our baseline
results.
Second, following Duo 2001, we interact baseline covariates with a linear trend and









δkX(s,1996),k + εst. (2.2)
In doing so, we allow FDI inows to be related to dierent underlying time trends in
entrepreneurial activity across states, depending on baseline state characteristics. Column 2
of Tables 5 and 6 report the estimates based on equation (2.2) and our conclusions remain
intact.
Third, it is conceivable to argue that FDI inows to the neighboring states are correlated
with our variable of interest and entrepreneurial activity. Although we condition on a detailed
composite tax index measure in our specications, a similar omitted variable bias argument
can be made if our composite measure does not fully capture the impact of all relevant tax
variables. To minimize concerns over these confounding eects, we extend our specications
by including the sum of FDI inows to the neighboring states, and state-level corporate and
average tax rates. The results from this exercise are reported in Column 3 of Tables 5 and
6. The coecients on FDI measures are unchanged.
Fourth, we include the lagged dependent variable to our baseline model. Doing so has
almost no eect on our point estimates (Column 4 of Tables 5 and 6). It is well known
that xed eects models with lagged dependent variables are biased for small T . Our goal
in including lagged entrepreneurial activity is only to show that the coecients on FDI
measures remain the same, thereby providing additional evidence that our results do not
suer from omitted variable bias.
Fifth, given the count-based nature of our dependent variable, we re-run our baseline
specications using a Poisson regression model. The results from this alternative specication
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are presented in Column 5 of the tables. Specically, a 10 percent increase in FDI decreases
the average monthly rate of business creation by roughly 3.1 percent (Panel B, Table 5),
while the same increase in FDI decreases the average monthly rate of business destruction
by 2.6 percent (Panel B, Table 6). These results are consistent with those obtained from
OLS regressions. We also experiment our analysis with a negative binomial regression and
the results remain the same.
Sixth, we perform a falsication test. We replace the lagged values from equation (1) with
the lead value of FDI (FDIst+1). Under the assumption that our results are not driven by
spurious correlations, one would expect FDIst+1 to have no eect on business creation and
destruction at time t. The presence of a signicant association compromises our identication
strategy. Looking at the last column of Panel B of Table 5, the point estimate for non-
RTW states ips sign. Therefore, if anything, this implies a positive selection bias, i.e., the
estimated eect of FDI on business creation in non-RTW states from Table 2 potentially
serves as a lower bound for the unknown true population parameter. Turning to Table 6, the
point estimates on the eect of lead FDI value are all highly insignicant and are very small
in magnitude. Recall that BLS collected FDI data over the 1977-2007 period. When we
run the falsication test, the eective sample is restricted to observations between 1994 and
2006. To have a more fair comparison, we also re-estimate our baseline specications with
this subsample of observations. The corresponding results are similar to those presented in
Tables 2 and 3.27
Finally, to examine whether our results are driven by one particular state, we estimate
equation (1) repeatedly, each time removing one state. Out of a total of 50 regressions, the
estimated eects of FDI on business creation rate are always precisely estimated in non-RTW
states, whereas the point estimates for the eect in RTW states are all small in magnitude
and are not dierent from zero. We nd exactly the same pattern when we consider FDI
27More precisely, the estimated eects from lag one and two on business creation in non-RTW states are
-0.145 (p-value=0.72) and -0.871 (p-value=0.09), respectively. The estimated eects from lag one and two on
business destruction in non-RTW states are -16.054 (p-value=0.01) and 1.178 (p-value=0.82), respectively.
No other point estimates are dierent from zero.
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and business destruction rate. We also tried longer lags (e.g., lag three) in our baseline
specications. None of the coecient estimates on these additional lags are dierent from
zero. Moreover, the estimated coecient eects are not sensitive to the inclusion of these
longer lags. All these additional results are available upon request.
2.6 Conclusion
The growing importance of FDI has also kindled a debate over its implications on economic
outcomes. The existing literature has extensively analyzed the impact of FDI on growth,
labor market outcomes and technology transfer. Surprisingly, little attention has been
devoted to the relationship between FDI and entrepreneurship. In this paper, we examine
the eect of FDI on entrepreneurial activity (measured by average monthly business creation
and destruction) at the individual-owner level. We utilize RTW status to make a crude but
convenient distinction pertaining to states' business climate as well as local labor market
conditions. To the extent that unobservable variables related to entrepreneurial activity do
not deviate from a state's trend when FDI deviates from the trend, our estimation approach
uncovers the causal eect of FDI on business creation and destruction.
Considering all states over the 19962008 period, we nd that FDI has a negative but
barely signicant impact on both the average business creation and destruction rates. FDI
has no eects on the entrepreneurial activity in RTW states. In non-RTW states, however,
we nd a negative impact of FDI on business creation and destruction rates. Our results
indicate that a 10 percent increase in FDI decreases average monthly rate of business
creation and destruction by roughly 4 and 2.5 percent (relative to sample mean), respectively.
Surprisingly, our estimates further imply that the net impact of FDI on entrepreneurial
activity in non-RTW states is positive. For example, population numbers from the 2010
CPS-ORG imply that a 10 percent increase in FDI kept about 17,500 entrepreneurs in
business. Several robustness checks and falsication tests support our ndings. We evaluate
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several potential channels underlying our ndings and propose an explanation related to
dierences in the opportunity costs of occupational choices in RTW and non-RTW states.
From a policy point of view, it may be misleading to draw a rm conclusion regarding
welfare implications of local labor-market policies (operating through entrepreneurial activity)
in non-RTW states. Lower business creation rate may eschew several benets (such as
innovation, growth, and job-creation) driven by new entrepreneurs. In addition, lower
business destruction rate may reect a less competitive environment, which adversely aects
consumer welfare and induces inecient entrepreneurs to stay in the market.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Entrepreneurial Activity and FDI
All States RTW States Non-RTW States
I II III
Entrepreneurs 82.213 84.647 80.301
(19.604) (19.596) (19.423)
Business-Creation 2.916 3.100 2.800
(0.816) (0.765) (0.827)
Business-Destruction 79.445 80.316 78.894
(13.855) (14.199) (13.621)
Log FDI 9.508 9.301 9.670
(1.089) (1.134) (1.021)
Notes: The data on business creation and destruction rates are from Fairlie's (2014) Kauman
Entrepreneurship Micro-Data Files (19962008) and the authors' calculations, and FDI data are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (19952007). Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 2. Impact of Log FDI on the Average Business-Creation Rate
Without Controls With Controls
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. All States
FDIt−1 -0.239 -0.083 -0.244 -0.106
p-value [0.290] [0.690] [0.316] [0.646]
FDIt−2 -0.452∗ -0.416 -0.458∗ -0.417
p-value [0.098] [0.140] [0.092] [0.138]
Panel B. RTW States
FDIt−1 0.025 -0.088 -0.072 -0.247
p-value [0.916] [0.868] [0.882] [0.622]
FDIt−2 0.268 0.306 0.511 0.595
p-value [0.410] [0.382] [0.262] [0.136]
Panel C. Non-RTW States
FDIt−1 -0.477 -0.104 -0.514 -0.179
p-value [0.186] [0.702] [0.172] [0.578]
FDIt−2 -1.083∗∗∗ -1.038∗∗∗ -1.104∗∗∗ -1.033∗∗∗
p-value [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: The sample sizes in panel A (All States), panel B (RTW States), and panel C (Non-RTW States) are 600, 264, and 336 observations,
respectively. All regressions include state and year xed eects, and state-specic linear trends. Control variables in Columns 46 include state's
log real GSP, log population, unemployment rate, real minimum wage, percentage of the state's adult population that are white, male, and college
graduates, private sector unionization rate, composite measures of tax, and fraction of adult population that are entrepreneurs at t-1. Numbers
in square brackets are p-values obtained from wild bootstrapping (999 repetitions) clustered at the state level; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3. Impact of Log FDI on the Average Business-Destruction Rate
Without Controls With Controls
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. All States
FDIt−1 -7.427 -5.932 -8.654∗ -6.739
p-value [0.142] [0.268] [0.064] [0.172]
FDIt−2 -6.529 -3.989 -8.419∗ -5.827
p-value [0.160] [0.400] [0.092] [0.230]
Panel B. RTW States
FDIt−1 7.141 7.334 5.054 5.978
p-value [0.224] [0.330] [0.384] [0.420]
FDIt−2 2.657 -0.518 -1.098 -3.150
p-value [0.656] [0.944] [0.902] [0.756]
Panel C. Non-RTW States
FDIt−1 -22.642∗∗∗ -19.968∗∗∗ -22.014∗∗∗ -19.666∗∗∗
p-value [0.004] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002]
FDIt−2 -16.020∗∗ -7.438 -14.986∗∗ -7.226
p-value [0.030] [0.208] [0.024] [0.246]
Notes: The sample sizes in panel A (All States), panel B (RTW States), and panel C (Non-RTW States) are 600, 264, and 336 observations,
respectively. All regressions include state and year xed eects, and state-specic linear trends. Control variables in Columns 46 include state's
log real GSP, log population, unemployment rate, real minimum wage, percentage of the state's adult population that are white, male, and college
graduates, private sector unionization rate, composite measures of tax, and fraction of adult population that are entrepreneurs at t-1. Numbers
in square brackets are p-values obtained from wild bootstrapping (999 repetitions) clustered at the state level; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4. Impact of Log FDI Composition on Entrepreneurial Activity
Excluded States:
CA, MA, NY
Entry Exit Entry Exit
Variable 1 2 3 4









Panel B. Non- RTW States
FDIm,t−1 0.002 -7.574 0.035 -7.754
p-value [0.988] [0.246] [0.856] [0.236]
FDIm,t−2 -0.615∗∗ -3.013 -0.596∗∗ -3.696
p-value [0.016] [0.400] [0.018] [0.326]
FDIo,t−1 -0.228 -7.656∗∗ -0.215 -8.177∗∗
p-value [0.362] [0.046] [0.406] [0.046]
FDIo,t−2 -0.514∗ -2.937 -0.530 -2.951
p-value [0.078] [0.530] [0.132] [0.534]
Notes: All regressions include state and year xed eects, state-specic linear trends, and control variables
specied in equation (1). Numbers in square brackets are p-values obtained from wild bootstrapping (999




Table 5. Robustness Checks: Impact of Log FDI on the Average Business-Creation Rate
Add Base Covars Additional Add Lagged
Quadratic Inter. with Controls Dependent Poisson Falsication
Trend Time Trend Variables Variable Regression Test
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. RTW States
FDIt−1 -0.245 -0.197 -0.241 -0.269 -0.072
p-value [0.622] [0.692] [0.584] [0.580] [0.539]
FDIt−2 0.595 0.462 0.517 0.592 0.174





Panel B. Non-RTW States
FDIt−1 -0.178 0.092 -0.149 -0.254 -0.044
p-value [0.578] [0.816] [0.624] [0.442] [0.673]
FDIt−2 -1.033∗∗∗ -0.687∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -1.096∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗





Notes: All regressions include state and year xed eects, state-specic linear trends. Columns 1-5 also include state's log real GSP, log population,
unemployment rate, real minimum wage, percentage of the state's adult population that are white, male, and college graduates, private sector
unionization rate, composite measures of tax, and the fraction of adult population that are entrepreneurs at t-1. Numbers in square brackets are
p-values obtained from wild bootstrapping (999 repetitions) clustered at the state level for columns 14 and 6, and from analytical standard errors
clustered at the state level for column 5; ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6. Robustness Checks: Impact of Log FDI on the Average Business-Destruction Rate
Add Base Covars Additional Add Lagged
Quadratic Inter. with Controls Dependent Poisson Falsication
Trend Time Trend Variables Variable Regression Test
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A. RTW States
FDIt−1 5.983 7.378 4.206 5.818 0.078
p-value [0.420] [0.322] [0.526] [0.428] [0.403]
FDIt−2 -3.148 0.426 -0.781 -3.080 -0.053





Panel B. Non-RTW States
FDIt−1 -19.648∗∗∗ -16.953∗∗∗ -18.809∗∗∗ -19.880∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
p-value [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
FDIt−2 -7.219 -0.902 -6.239 -9.867 -0.084





Notes: All regressions include state and year xed eects, state-specic linear trends. Columns 1-5 also include state's log real GSP, log population,
unemployment rate, real minimum wage, percentage of the state's adult population that are white, male, and college graduates, private sector
unionization rate, composite measures of tax, and the fraction of adult population that are entrepreneurs at t-1. Numbers in square brackets are
p-values obtained from wild bootstrapping (999 repetitions) clustered at the state level for columns 14 and 6, and from analytical standard errors
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Chapter 3. Breastfeeding and Early Childhood
Outcomes: Is There a Causal Relationship?
3.1 Introduction
Breastfeeding is a prime source of nutrients. The observational research suggests that
breastfeeding reduces the risk of infection and obesity and advances cognitive development.
Referring to studies reporting benets of breastfeeding on a wide range of child outcomes,
the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
(UNICEF) recommend breastfeeding babies for the rst six months of life exclusively. Breastfeeding
has also been promoted in the United States.1 Figure 3.1 presents time-series of the incidence
of breastfeeding for the period of 2002-2012: the number of U.S. children who were ever
breastfed and breastfed at least 6 months has been increasing to 80.0 and 51.4 percent from
71.4 and 37.9 percent over a decade (Department of Health and Human Service 2015).
Healthy People 2020 (2010) aims to achieve an even higher incidence of breastfeeding, 81.9
percent and 60.6 percent for ever breastfed and at least 6 month breastfed respectively.
The common perception that breastfeeding benets child outcomes has also been greatly
reinforced by the supporting research (Morrow-Tlucak, Haude, and Ernhart 1988; Lucas
et al. 1992; Dewey, Heinig, and Nommsen-Rivers 1995; Raisler, Alexander, and O'Campo
1999; Miralles et al. 2006; Beleld and Kelly 2012). However, caution must be warranted.
Most studies depend on observed variations in breastfeeding which are arguably endogeneous
to the specications. The lack of evidence supported by valid instrumental variables and
randomized control trials raises concerns on the causal eect of breastfeeding on various
outcomes. Potential violation of the zero conditional mean assumption - independence of
1Government agencies (e.g. the U.S. department of Health and Human Services), professional associations
(e.g. the American Academy of Pediatrics), and non prot organizations (e.g. La Leche League International
and United States Breastfeeding Committee) promote breastfeeding.
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the decision to breastfeed from child outcomes - may lead to misleading inference about the
benets of breastfeeding.
Of all the existing studies in breastfeeding literature, a countable number of research
papers investigating the causal impact of breastfeeding on early childhood outcomes report
mixed ndings at best. Baker and Milligan (2008) nd that an increase in mandatory
maternity leave in Canada increases a mother's time away from work and breastfeeding
duration but has no eect on a child's health outcomes. Using the Birth Cohort of Early
Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS-B) data, Jenkins and Foster (2013) report that
breastfeeding has little benet on early childhood test scores. Utilizing random variation in
breastfeeding support service on weekdays and weekends, Fitzsimons and Vera-Hernández
(2015) identify a positive eect of breastfeeding on a child's cognitive development but no
statistically signicant eect on health outcomes in U.K.2
This paper has two objectives. First, we revisit the associations between breastfeeding
and outcomes pertaining to early childhood health and cognitive ability using the restricted
ECLS-B data. We leverage the rich collection of the information on observables including
prenatal, child, and parents characteristics and breastfeeding practice (e.g., the incidence
and duration of breastfeeding) to explore these correlations. Second, we evaluate if one
can claim these correlations are causal under the various assumptions (e.g., equality of
selection on unobservables and observables and random selection). As such, we use the
sensitivity check conducted by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005). With their technique, we
can estimate both the lower and upper bounds of the eect of breastfeeding, allowing us to
judge whether these correlations are causal. Furthermore we calculate the ratio of selection
on unobservables to selection on observables that accounts for the entire positive association
between breastfeeding and early child outcomes.
2Implementing a randomized Promotion of Breastfeeding Intervention Trial (PROBIT) in Belarus,
Kramer et al. (2001, 2007, 2008, 2009) nd that prolonged and exclusive breastfeeding has a limited positive
eect on a child's health, no discernible eect on nonverbal-IQ, and a positive eect on verbal-IQ. Note
that Kramer et al.'s PROBIT includes only breastfed babies and captures the intention-to-treatment of
breastfeeding promotion program, Baby Friendly Hospital Initiative (BFHI). See Kramer et al. (2001) for
detail of their research design.
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Our ndings using the ECLS-B data is mostly consistent with those of the observational
studies: the estimated eects of breastfeeding are positive and signicant on early childhood
health and cognitive development. Controlling for child and family characteristics rarely
alters the result, although the eects of breastfeeding on 48-month outcomes are imprecisely
estimated. Including prenatal attributes continues to produce the relatively large eect of
breastfeeding. Our sensitivity checks, however, raise concerns regarding the causal eect
of breastfeeding on these outcomes. The lower bound of the eect of breastfeeding is not
dierent from zero at the ve percent level of signicance on a child's health outcomes
and are even negative on the cognitive ability. Our further examination indicates that
even 10 percent of selection on unobservables is sucient to account for the entire positive
associations between breastfeeding and early childhood outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes empirical strategy
and section 3 explains data. Section 4 reports the estimation results and section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
3.2.1 Baseline Model
We estimate the outcome equation:
Yi = Xiγ + αBFi + εi. (3.1)
where Yi is the various outcomes for child i, BFi is an indicator variable taking the value of
one if the child was breastfed and zero otherwise, X ′i is the set of observable characteristics,
and εi is the error term.3 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator of α is unbiased to the
3We mostly follow the empirical methodology employed by Eren and Ozbeklik (2015).
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extent the mean of the error term conditional on observed characteristics is independent of
parents' decision to breastfeed, E[εi|BFi, Xi] = 0.
3.2.2 Nonrandom Selection and Assessment of Selection Bias
The causal interpretation of the eect of breastfeeding hinges on the zero conditional mean
assumption. However, parents' decision to breastfeed is possibly endogenous to the OLS
specication. For example, a mother who invests more household resources in her child's
education may be inclined to breastfeed as she knew benets of breastfeeding reported
by observational studies. Her enthusiasm for her child's success, which is unobserved to
researchers, may be positively associated with the decision to breastfeed and early childhood
outcomes. Selection on unobservables of this kind consequently bias the estimated coecient
on the decision to breastfeed upward. Ethical issues to implement a randomized control trial
for the decision to breastfeed and diculties in coming across with a valid instrument prevent
drawing credible inferences about causality. To circumvent these challenges, we employ the
econometric technique proposed by Altonji et al. (2005).4 Our approach is based on the idea
of using the portion of selection on observables that determine the decision to breastfeed to
measure how much selection there is on unobservables that determine a child's outcomes.
Consider the bivariate probit model:
BFi = 1(X
′
iβ + υi > 0),
Yi = 1(X
′











where BFi, Yi, X ′i, and εi are the same as equation 4.1, and υi is the usual error term
4Oster (2014) develops the econometric technique to identify the omitted variable bias under the
proportional selection assumption.
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for breastfeeding equation. Altonji et al. (2005) prove that one can identify an upper
bound on α that happens when we assume Cov(BFi, εi)/V ar(εi) = 0 and a lower bound
that happens when we assume that Cov(BFi, εi)/V ar(εi) = Cov(BFi, X ′iγ)/V ar(X
′
iγ). An
intuitive interpretation of these conditions is as follows: The former condition states that
the portion of Yi associated with the unobservable characteristics has no association with
the decision to breastfeed BFi; in contrast, the latter condition states that the portion of
Yi that is associated with the observable characteristics and the portion associated with
the unobservable characteristics are equally associated with the decision to breastfeed. As
such, denoting ρ to be the correlation between the error terms of breastfeeding and outcome
equations, these conditions simplify an interval of ρ with an upper and a lower bounds as





In our subsequent empirical work, we estimate the bivariate probit model using a set of
equations (3.2) and maximize the likelihood by imposing ρ = Cov(BFi, X ′iγ)/V ar(X
′
iγ). If
the lower-bound estimates yield substantial positive eects of breastfeeding, we interpret
them as evidence of causal impacts of breastfeeding.
The equality of observables and unobservables is derived from the key assumption that
the set of covariates observable to researchers is randomly drawn from the full set of elements
that determines the decision to breastfeed and the early childhood outcomes (Altonji et al.,
2005). While this assumption might not hold completely, it is more likely to be applicable to
the nature of a large-scale survey than an OLS assumption. Large-scale datasets including
ECLS-B are designed to provide a wide variety of information rather than to address the
unique question that a randomized controlled experiment is. Additionally, because large-
scale surveys such as these have limited budgets and are intended to collect information for
several elds of research, the available elements in these datasets are likely to be a good
approximation of a random subset of all the elements that address a unique question (e.g.
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the eect of breastfeeding). Other necessary assumptions are a relatively large number of
observables are available and none of the observables and unobservables play a dominant
role on determining outcome variables.
3.2.3 The Relative Extent of Selection on Unobservables
In addition to bounding the treatment eect under various assumptions, we can also calculate
the normalized extent of the relationship between the decision to breastfeed and unobservables
that determine early child outcomes by the ratio {E[εi|BFi = 1]−E[εi|BFi = 0]}/V ar(εi).5
Similarly, the normalized extent of the relationship between breastfeeding and a set of
observables can be expressed as the ratio {E[X ′iγ|BFi = 1]− E[X ′iγ|BFi = 0]}/V ar(X ′iγ).6
The equality of these ratios - equivalent to equality of selection on observables and unobservables
- enables us to ask how large the portion of selection on unobservables relative to the portion
of selection on observables is required to account for the entire positive association between
breastfeeding α and a child's outcomes.
We now return to the breastfeeding equation of model (3.2). Regression of outcomes on
observables and breastfeeding provides us with the tted values of X ′iβ̂ and the residuals υ̂i
(BFi = X ′iβ̂ + υ̂i). Replacing BFi in the outcome equation with the tted values and the
residuals, we can express equation (4.1) as BFi = X ′i(γ+αβ̂)+αυ̂i+εi. The OLS estimator of
α converges in probability to plim α̂ = α+V ar(BFi)/V ar(υ̂i){E[εi|BFi = 1]−E[εi|BFi = 0]}
where the second term is the bias. Equating the portion of selection on observables to that









Under the null hypothesis that there is no eect of breastfeeding, estimating the equation
5Note that εi denotes the error terms from equation (4.1) and the outcome equation of model (3.2).
6X ′i and γ are a vector of observables and and parameters from equation (4.1).
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4.1 imposing α=0 yields consistent estimates of γ and hence E[X ′iγ|BFi]. We can compute
an estimate of the bias by plugging the value of V ar(BFi), the variance of the residuals, and
the estimate of γ in bias 3.4.
Altonji et al (2005) denes the ratio of the OLS estimate of α from equation 4.1 to the
bias 3.4 as the implied ratio. It gauges how much the portion of selection on unobservables
to the portion of selection on observables would be required to account for the entire positive
association between breastfeeding and early childhood outcomes. Although we have no clear
cuto of large and small values in an implied ratio, we may reasonably conclude that a value
in a range of zero to one means that the positive associations between breastfeeding and a
child's outcomes are sensitive to selection on unobservables, and greater than one as a sign
of a causal relationship (Altonji et al. 2005).
3.3 Data
The ECLS-B is a longitudinal study of children during the rst six years. The ECLS-B
follows a sample of approximately 14,000 children and oversamples for racial minority, twins,
and low-birth weight children. Information about these children were collected in 2001-02
(roughly nine months old), 2003-04 (roughly 24 months old), and 2005-06 (roughly 48 months
old).
The ECLS-B collects information on a number of outcomes, including cognitive ability,
physical development, and a record of health problems. Parent and child surveys in the nine-
month wave provide a wide range of information on child characteristics, family background,
geological location, a mother's prenatal attributes, and most importantly the decision to
breastfeed and duration of breastfeeding. Each child was also administered a series of shorter
and full versions of the Bayley Short Form (BSF) to measure mental development at nine
and 24 months old and tests used on Kindergarten Cohort of Early Childhood Longitudinal
Survey (ECLS-K) at 48 months old. The parent responded whether her baby had suered
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from asthma, respiratory illness, gastrointestinal illness, and ear infection. Moreover, the
body mass index (BMI) measures for the children were collected at the 24- and 48-month
wave.
Our outcomes of interest are as follows: (i) an indicator variable for no health problem
taking the value of one if a child did not suer from respiratory illness, asthma, gastrointestinal
illness, or ear infection by the date of the nine-, 24-, and 48-month survey, and zero otherwise,
(ii) an indicator for normal weight that takes the value of one if a child was categorized as
neither overweight nor obese at the time of the 24- and 48-month survey, and (iii) cognitive
score which is standardized to have a mean zero and a standard deviation one.
We dene two indicator variables for variables of interest. The ever breastfed indicator
takes the value of one if a child was ever breastfed, and zero if never. To capture intensity,
we also dene an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a child was breastfed
for more than six months, and zero if never. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for
breastfeeding variables. About 67 percent of children were ever breastfed and 27 percent
were at-least-6-month breastfed relative to those who were never breastfed.7 Although these
frequencies of breastfeeding on the ECLS-B data are slightly lower than the corresponding
numbers reported in the National Immunization Survey (70.3 and 34.5 percent respectively)
owing to an oversample for racial minority and low-birth weight children, it is reassuring
that our measures are not far o from those of the national representative survey.
Table 3.2 reports the means of a set of nine-, 24-, and 48-month outcomes for children
who were ever breastfed and were breastfed for more than 6 months relative to those who were
never breastfed. Contrasting these unconditional means shows a stark dierence. Breastfed
children are far less likely to have health problems than the never-breastfed children and
are less likely to be overweight. The dierence in cognitive scores is large - for example,
7Our incidence of ever breast-fed is similar to that of Beleld and Kelly (2012).
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about 0.27 standard deviation units higher on the 24-month cognitive score for the breastfed
children.
Table 3.2 also presents the means of various child characteristics, family background,
geographical information, and mother's prenatal attributes. White, married parents with
higher education are more likely to breastfeed their babies. A wealthier household with
few children is also more likely to select into breastfeeding. It is noteworthy that mothers
who have higher BMI measures during pregnancy are less likely to breastfeed their babies,
although lighter babies at birth are less likely to be breastfed. There are few noticeable
dierences between the sample of children who were ever breastfed and were breastfed for
more than 6 month. We thus only report the estimates using the sample of the children who
were breasted for more than six months and were never breastfed in the text and relegate
ndings on those who were ever breastfed and never to Appendix A.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Breastfeeding and Early Childhood Outcomes
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the coecient estimates on breastfeeding from probit and
OLS models for no health problem, and cognitive score at nine months. Huber-White
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The raw dierence in means for no
health problem is 0.063, as reported by the average marginal eect in the square brackets
(column 1). When we add the child characteristics, the marginal eect slightly increases in
magnitude, which is indicative that observable child characteristics explain a small fraction
of the variation in the no health problem. The size of this estimated eect is somewhat large
- 8.4 percent reduction in probability that a child suers from illness. The estimate contracts
slightly to 0.059 when we include family background and region controls in column (3) and
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contracts further to 0.052 when we include a set of prenatal attributes including mother's
BMI and indicators for whether a mother smoked, drank, was employed, and received WIC.
The estimated eect of breastfeeding is stable and marginally signicant.
Cognitive scores, however, provide a dierent pattern. The dierence in mean for cognitive
score is 0.108 and signicant at the ve percent level. The estimated eect of breastfeeding on
cognitive score is moderate - 0.108 standard deviation units increase in cognitive score. When
we add a set of a child's age in month, birth weight, gender, and race, statistical signicance
has however disappeared. The estimated eects of breastfeeding remain insignicant once
additional sets of controls are included.
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents estimates of the eect of breastfeeding on 24-month outcome
variables. The rst row of the panel presents the estimated eect of breastfeeding on the
probability that a child is neither overweight nor obese. Inclusion of control variables leaves
the estimated coecient on breastfeeding almost intact: the unconditional dierence of 0.107
contracts to 0.102 when child characteristics, family background, and region are added to
the control variables and to 0.088 when prenatal attributes are further added. The estimated
eect is a nine percent increase in the probability that a child is a normal weight. The third
row presents the estimates of the eect of breastfeeding on cognitive score. The raw dierence
of 0.385 contracts to 0.183 once all the detailed controls have been included. The estimated
eect of breastfeeding is positive and is signicant - 0.183 standard deviation units increase
in cognitive score. We further examine the eect of breastfeeding on 48-month outcomes in
panel C of Table 3.3. None of the estimates are precisely estimated when we have added a
full set of control variables.8
Of all eight outcome variables, the estimated eects on no health problem at nine months
old as well as on normal weight and cognitive score at 24 months old are positive and
8Gelbach (2016) suggests that one abandon sequentially including control variables to a base model in
order to check the stability of the estimates of interest. Aligned with the existing studies, we report the
results from conventional sequential inclusions, but we also employed Gelbach's conditional decomposition.
This result is available upon request.
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precisely estimated in our most extensive specication. These estimates can be assumed to
be unbiased under the zero conditional mean assumption. Although we control for a rich
set of observables, it is still possible that our point estimates are confounded by selection on
unobservables. We now further explore this possibility.
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 3.4 reports point estimates of the impact of breastfeeding that correspond to various
values of ρ, the correlation in the error terms between breastfeeding and outcome equations
(3.2). We report results for nine-month no health problem in panel A and 24-month normal
weight and cognitive score in panel B, and present probit estimates and average marginal
eects in brackets. We set ρ equal to zero (univariate probit case) and increase the value of ρ
up to 0.2 by estimating bivariate probit models simultaneously setting ρ to the specic value.
We use a 24-month cognitive score indicator as a substitute for the continuous cognitive score.
9 The raw dierence in the probability that a child had no health problem is 0.063. When
ρ = 0, the estimated eect is 0.052, and the gure contracts to 0.019 when ρ = 0.05 and
even further to -0.013 when ρ = 0.1. The former estimate is insignicant and the latter
even has a negative sign. Given that a small value of selection to breastfeeding can wipe
out the entire positive association, we have the considerably weaker evidence for a strong
eect of breastfeeding than indicated by the results from a regression treating the decision
to breastfeed as exogenous.
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the results for the 24-month normal weight and cognitive
score. The results are quite similar to the nine-month no health problem. The eect of
breastfeeding on the probability that a child weighs normal is 0.088 when ρ = 0, and contracts
to 0.030 and is insignicant when ρ = 0.1. The sign of the estimate even becomes negative
when we impose stronger correlation ρ = 0.2. The eect of breastfeeding on the probability
9Cognitive score takes one if a child earns Bayley Short Form - Research Edition (BSF-R) mental score
greater than the median of the distribution of the scores, and zero otherwise.
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that a child earns a cognitive score greater than the median of its score distribution shows
a similar pattern. The eect is 0.072 when ρ = 0, which points to a positive, signicant
eect similar to the OLS estimate on cognitive score. It contracts to 0.011 when ρ = 0.1,
and becomes negative when ρ = 0.2.
Having shown some preliminary evidence on the sensitivity of the results, we now proceed
to formally testing the sensitivity of the positive associations reported in Table 3.4 using the
strategy developed in Altonji et al. (2005).
3.4.3 Results under Equality of Observables and Unobservables
The last column of Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the eect of breastfeeding in the
bivariate probit model by imposing ρ = Cov(BFi, X ′iγ)/V ar(X
′
iγ) as discussed on equation
(3.3). For nine-month no health problem, the estimate of ρ is 0.11. The estimate of the eect
of breastfeeding is -0.058 (0.071), which is insignicant with the negative sign. Under the
assumption of equality of selection on observables and unobservables, the estimate suggests
that there be no evidence of the causal eect of breastfeeding on health at nine months old.
The result for 24-month normal weight follows a similar pattern, although the assumption
of equality of selection on observables and unobservables leads to a positive estimated eect
of breastfeeding 0.105 (0.086) along with ρ = 0.09. The average marginal eect is moderate
0.036 and imprecisely estimated. Moreover, the result for 24-month cognitive score shows how
sensitive the relationship is between parents' decision to breastfeed and a child's cognitive
development. The entire positive eect of breastfeeding has disappeared when ρ = 0.47,
indicating strong nonrandom selection to breastfeeding. Given the result of our sensitivity
analysis and evaluation on selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables,
there is little evidence that breastfeeding advances a child's health and cognitive ability at
the age of nine, 24, and 48 months.
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3.4.4 Nonrandom Selection
As a nal check, we report the implied ratios in Table 3.5. Each column corresponds to
nine-month no health problem and 24-month normal weight and cognitive score. The rst
row of Table 3.5 presents the unconstrained estimate of the eect of breastfeeding α on these
three outcome variables. The second row presents the estimate of the bias 3.4. The third row
displays the implied ratio by dividing the unconstrained estimate by the bias. Recall that
one can use the value of one and above as indicator of a potential causal relationship. For
nine-month no health problem, the implied ratio is only 0.12; that means, if the normalized
extent of selection on unobservables relative to that on observables is 12 percent, the positive
association between breastfeeding and a child's health is fully explained. Similarly, the
implied ratios for 24-month normal weight and cognitive score are well below one: the
implied ratio is 0.07 for normal weight and 0.11 for cognitive score. It indicates that 7 and 11
percent of selection on unobservables relative to that on observables are sucient to account
for the positive associations between breastfeeding and a child's weight and cognitive scores.
Overall, the positive associations between breastfeeding and a child's outcomes appear to be
quite sensitive to selection into breastfeeding.
3.5 Conclusion
In the last decade or so, factors advancing early childhood health and cognitive development
have received considerable attention among researchers and policy makers. This paper
examines one of the potential factors, breastfeeding. Using the ECLS-B data and employing
the econometric methodology proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), we evaluate the associations
between breastfeeding - the prime source of nutrients at the earliest stage of human lives -
and health as well as cognitive development. We nd breastfeeding is positively associated
with the probabilities that a child has no health problem, is at a normal weight, and acquires
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better cognitive ability. Our further ndings, however, suggest that the positive breastfeeding
eect is very sensitive to nonrandom selection to breastfeeding and 10 percent of selection
on unobservables is sucient to account for the positive associations between breastfeeding
and early childhood outcomes.
Before we conclude, there are two caveats to keep in mind. First we explore the impact
of breastfeeding on the population of children born in 2001 in the United States. Given
the high degree of economic inequality and constrained maternity leaves, our ndings might
not be generalized to other countries. Second, it is crucial to note that breastfeeding may
aect outcomes other than the early childhood outcomes examined in our study. There may
be eects on child health and academic performance in later stages of life (Rees and Sabia
2009; Fletcher 2011). The increase in mother-child interaction owing to breastfeeding may
foster development of a bond between mothers and children in early infancy (Fergusson
and Woodward 1999; Britton, Britton, and Gronwaldt 2006). The aggregate eect of
breastfeeding would have to be examined by accounting for all benecial eects in these
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Figure 3.1: Breastfeeding among U.S. Children Born 2002-2012
Notes: National Immunization Survey, Department of Health and Human Service (2015).




Ever breast-fed 0.67 10,550
Breast-fed for 6+ months 0.27 4,700
Source: ECLS-B nine month wave.
Note: Not ascertained, don't know, refused, and Not
applicable are assigned to missing values. All variables
are measured at nine months from the response by the
mother.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics For Outcome and Explanatory Variables
Ever BF vs Never 6m+ bf vs never
No bf Bf No bf 6+ bf
Mean Mean Di Mean Mean Di
9 month outcome variables
No health problem 0.47 0.54 -0.06*** 0.47 0.55 -0.08***
Cognitive score -0.09 0.05 -0.14*** -0.09 0.11 -0.20***
24 month outcome variables
Normal weight 0.71 0.75 -0.04*** 0.71 0.76 -0.05**
No health problem 0.51 0.51 -0.00 0.51 0.51 -0.00
Cognitive score -0.18 0.09 -0.27*** -0.18 0.21 -0.40***
48 month outcome variables
Normal weight 0.66 0.70 -0.03** 0.66 0.72 -0.06***
No health problem 0.59 0.58 0.01 0.59 0.56 0.03
Cognitive score -0.10 0.05 -0.15*** -0.10 0.06 -0.16***
Child information
Age (month) 10.51 10.46 0.05 10.51 10.86 -0.35***
Birth weight (kg) 2.79 2.98 -0.19*** 2.79 3.04 -0.25***
Male 0.51 0.51 0.00 0.51 0.50 0.02
White 0.39 0.42 -0.03** 0.39 0.45 -0.06***
Family information
Married 0.51 0.73 -0.22*** 0.51 0.81 -0.30***
Mother's years of schooling 12.34 13.76 -1.42*** 12.34 14.32 -1.98***
Father's years of schooling 12.97 13.97 -1.00*** 12.97 14.44 -1.47***
Number of siblings 1.20 1.03 0.16*** 1.20 1.08 0.11**
Log income 10.05 10.55 -0.49*** 10.05 10.73 -0.68***
Socioeconomic Scale -0.41 0.12 -0.54*** -0.41 0.32 -0.73***
Geographical information
Urban 0.80 0.88 -0.08*** 0.80 0.89 -0.09***
Prenatal information
BMI 31.29 30.56 0.73*** 31.29 29.87 1.42***
Smoked 0.20 0.09 0.12*** 0.20 0.04 0.16***
Drinking 0.01 0.01 0.00* 0.01 0.00 0.01
Working 0.70 0.71 -0.01 0.70 0.70 -0.00
WIC 0.56 0.35 0.21*** 0.56 0.28 0.27***
N 3450 7100 10550 3450 1300 4700
Source: ECLS-B nine-, 24-, and 48-month wave.
Note: Not ascertained, don't know, refused, and not applicable are assigned to missing
values. Birth weight, parents' years of schooling, and log household income are converted
to contenuous variables from categorical variables by assigning the mean of the upper/lower
bounds of each interval. Missing values on age, parents' education, log household income,
and variables used for mother's BMI are imputed with mean of variables. *, **, and ***
dierence are statistically signicant at the .1, .05, and .01 level.
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Table 3.3: Probit and OLS Estimates of Breastfeeding Eects








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 9 months No health problem (N=3,850)
:Breastfeeding 0.158** 0.217*** 0.154** 0.135*
(0.063) (0.065) (0.071) (0.072)
[0.063] [0.084] [0.059] [0.052]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03
Cognitive score (N=3,800)
Breastfeeding 0.108** 0.048 -0.006 -0.000
(0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051)
R2 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.07
Panel B: 24 months Normal weight (N=3,300)
:Breastfeeding 0.302*** 0.338*** 0.296*** 0.257***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.080) (0.081)
[0.107] [0.117] [0.102] [0.088]
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
No health problem (N=3,300)
:Breastfeeding -0.049 -0.048 -0.063 -0.095
(0.068) (0.069) (0.076) (0.076)
[-0.019] [-0.018] [-0.024] [-0.036]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
Cognitive score (N=3,300)
Breastfeeding 0.385*** 0.320*** 0.180*** 0.183***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
R2 0.03 0.11 0.15 0.15
Panel C: 48 months Normal weight (N=2,950)
:Breastfeeding 0.186** 0.239*** 0.123 0.045
(0.074) (0.075) (0.083) (0.084)
[0.069] [0.086] [0.044] [0.016]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06
No health problem (N=2,950)
:Breastfeeding -0.007 0.018 0.037 0.024
(0.071) (0.073) (0.080) (0.081)
[-0.003] [0.007] [0.015] [0.009]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Cognitive score (N=2,850)
Breastfeeding 0.101* 0.084 0.008 0.008
(0.061) (0.062) (0.069) (0.070)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note. ECLS-B panel weights are used. Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. Average marginal
eects are in brackets. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity of Estimates of Breastfeeding Eects on Health
Outcomes and Cognitive Score to Assumptions about Selection Bias in
ECLS-B
6m+ BF vs Never CORRELATION OF DISTURBANCESa




Panel A: 9 months No health problem
:Breastfeeding 0.135 0.050 -0.034 -0.201 -0.058
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071)
[0.052] [0.019] [-0.013] [-0.077] [-0.022]
Constraint on ρ 0.11
Panel B: 24 months Normal weight
:Breastfeeding 0.256 0.171 0.085 -0.084 0.105
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086)
[0.088] [0.059] [0.030] [-0.029] [0.036]
Constraint on ρ 0.09
Cognitive score
:Breastfeeding 0.202 0.117 0.032 -0.135 -0.596
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) (0.075)
[0.072] [0.042] [0.011] [-0.048] [-0.210]
Constraint on ρ 0.47
Note.- The ECLS-B sampling weights are used in the computations. The control
variables are identical to those described in note a, b, and c of Table 3.3. Average
marginal eects are in brackets. Huber-White standard errors are presented in
parentheses. Cognitive score takes one if a child earns BSF-R mental score greater
than the medians of its distribution, and zero otherwise.
a Models estimated as bivariate probits with the correlation ρ between u and ε set to
the values in column headings.
b The model is BF = 1(X ′β + u > 0) and Y = 1(X ′γ + αBF + ε > 0); β, γ, and α
are estimated simultaneously as a constrained bivariate probit model.
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Table 3.5: Amount of Selection on Unobservables Relative to Selection
on Observables Required to Attribute the Entire Breastfeeding Eect to
Selection Bias
6m+ BF vs Never 9 months 24 months
No health problem Normal weight Cognitive scorec
α̂ 0.05 0.09 0.18
Cov(BF, ε)/V ar(υ̂)a 0.45 1.28 1.65
Implied ratiob 0.12 0.07 0.11
Note. The model Y = 1(X'γ+αBF+ε > 0) for no health problem and normal weight
and Y = X'γ + αBF + ε for cognitive scores were estimated by OLS. The γ̂ used
to evaluate [Ê(X ′γ̂|BF = 1) − Ê(X ′γ̂|BF = 0)]/ ˆV ar(X ′γ̂) is estimated under the
restriction α = 0, using the sample of the more than 6 month breastfed and never
breastfedd infants. The ECLS-B panel weights are used. See notes a, b, and c of
Table 3.3 for a description of the controls.
a To the extent equality of selection on observables and unobservables holds: that
is, [E(ε|BF = 1) − E(ε|BF = 0)]/V ar(ε) = [E(X ′γ|BF = 1) − E(X ′γ|BF =
0)]/V ar(X ′γ).
b The implied ratio in row 3 on each panel is the ratio of standardized selection on
unobservables to observables under the hypothesis that there is no breastfeeding
eect.
c Cognitive score is a standardized continous variable.
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Chapter 4. Ban the Box and Recidivism
4.1 Introduction
70 million Americans have past criminal histories (Friedman, 2015; Groggins and DeBacco,
2015) and 650,000 ex-oenders are released from federal and state prisons every year (United
States Department of Justice, 2017). Most job application forms in the United States ask
if an applicant has been convicted of a crime and, if the box for yes has been ticked, the
application tends to be discarded at the initial screening stage. Ban-the-Box (BTB) policies
restrict employers from asking about applicants' criminal histories on job applications and
delay background checks until interviews are completed. BTB policies are intended to give
people with criminal records an opportunity to display their qualications in the hiring
process before being assessed and potentially rejected based on this record (Stacy and Cohen,
2017). Other application settings such as university application (State University of New
York, 2016), housing application (Kurzius, 2016), and job application for medical centers
(Thill, Abare, and Fox, 2014) also employ BTB policies (Stacy and Cohen, 2017).
Recent studies on BTB policy have focused on its eect on labor market outcomes,
particularly statistical discrimination. Agan and Starr (2016) utilize the recent adoption of
BTB policies in New Jersey and New York City. Agan and Starr randomly vary the race
and felony conviction status of the applicants and send out thousands of fake online job
applications to employers before and after BTB policies were adopted. Agan and Starr nd
that White applicants receive slightly more call backs than similar Black applicants before
the adoption of BTB, and BTB increases this White-Black disparity dramatically. Doleac
and Hansen (2016) exploit variation in the timing of BTB adoption across jurisdictions over
a period of 2004-2014 and estimate the eect of BTB on employment for White, Black, and
Hispanic age 25-34 males without college degree. Doleac and Hansen nd that BTB reduces
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the probability of being employed by 5.1% for young, low skilled Black males. Doleac and
Hansen conclude that lack of information on applicants' criminal histories induces employers
to select less applicants who are more likely to have criminal records (Black males). Shoag
and Veuger (2016) compare employment for the residents of high-crime census tracts, a proxy
for those with criminal records, to employment for the residents of low-crime census tracts, a
proxy for those without criminal records, before and after the introduction of BTB policies.
Shoag and Veuger nd that BTB improves the employment level of high-crime neighborhoods
and induces employers to substitute employment of Black males with employment of female
workers. However, there are few studies, as far as we are concerned, devoted to investigating
the eect of BTB on rates of recidivism.1
We contribute to this strand of the literature by analyzing the eect of BTB policy
for oenders recently released using the National Correctional Reporting Program (NCRP)
2000-2014 dataset (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2016). Until recently, there were limited
panel datasets that allowed researchers to link prison terms for the same oenders over
time (Yang 2016).2 Recently, Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) linked prison terms using a
oenders' characteristics, making it possible to study a representative analysis of recidivism
at a national scale. NCRP data also contain information on the county where sentence of
each oender was imposed. Following the commonly-applied assumption that the county
of an oender's sentence is the county in which he/she resides and to which he/she returns
upon release (Schnepel, 2016; Yang, 2016), we aggregate a dataset of more than four million
rst-sentence ex-oenders to dene rates of recidivism at the year-county level. We then
assign adoption of BTB policy to counties across time. We align our research samples with
1D'Alessio, Stolzenburg, and Flexon (2015) examine the eect of BTB law in Hawaii on repeat oending.
D'Alessio, Stolzenburg, and Flexon nd that a criminal defendant prosecuted in Honolulu for a felony crime
was 57% less likely to have a prior criminal conviction after the adoption of BTB law.
2An exception is Schnepel (2016). Even before NCRP panel data was made publicly available, Schnepel
uses prison release and parole outcome data of NCRP for prison release for a period of 1993-2008 and match
them using date of birth, date of prison release, and county of sentencing. Note his analysis sample consists
of oenders released in California.
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the two age groups on which existing studies focused, age 18-65 (working-age) and age 25-34
(young) oenders.
We employ a dierence-in-dierences (DID) approach to identify the eect of BTB on
one-year rates of recidivism. We control for year and county xed eects, county-specic
linear time trends, and county characteristics. As long as that the average rate of recidivism
in BTB counties with no BTB policy would evolve similarly in non-BTB counties over the
sample period, our empirical model identify causal eects of BTB policies. We test the
validity of our identication assumption by estimating a main specication augmented with
leads and lags of BTB adoption.
We nd a large and signicant eect of BTB on recidivism. The estimated eects relative
to the pre-adoption means are a 29% reduction for working-age ex-oenders and a 24%
reduction for young ex-oenders. Our results also indicate that the eect of BTB policy
grows substantially over time upon its adoption: The reduction grows from 3.4 percentage
points in the rst BTB post-adoption year to 7.4-8.1 percentage points in the following years.
Further examination on heterogeneous eects reveals that BTB policies disproportionately
prevent Black male ex-oenders from returning to prison but may benet little female ex-
oenders or young ex-oenders in highly educated counties. In a labor market analysis, we
nd that, as Doleac and Hansen (2016) report, BTB laws induce employers to statistically
discriminate against Blacks in the working age and young populations. We also nd that
employment opportunities in industries which employ more ex-oenders are complement
with BTB policies to prevent ex-oenders from returning to prison: The estimated eect
in the post-BTB counties is a 3.1% reduction in recidivism for young ex-oenders. With
certain tests, these ndings are robust.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes background,
section 3 explains data, section 4 discusses empirical strategy, section 5 reports results,
section 6 discusses policy implication, and section 7 concludes.
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4.2 Background
Employment applications typically ask applicants to "check a box" if they have a criminal
record. Typically, employment applications with positive responses to this question (and a
checked box) are thrown away. As the name suggests, BTB law prohibits employers from
including the box and gives ex-oenders more opportunities to display their qualications
before their background checks have been conducted at the employment decision stage. First
implemented in Hawaii in 1998, BTB laws have been adopted by states, counties, and cities
in the contiguous United States since 2005. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show counties with active
BTB laws in 2000 and 2014.
BTB laws are comprised of three broad categories; those that aect public employers;
those that aect private employers with government contracts; and those that aect all
private employers. Public BTB laws are the most common, and private BTB laws are
normally the nal step a jurisdiction takes. Every jurisdiction in our sample with a contract
BTB and a private BTB has a public BTB law. Following the approach of Doleac and
Hansen (2016), our analysis focuses on the eects of having adopted a public BTB law.
Public BTB law is expected to promote ex-oenders' employment in both public and
private sectors. These BTB policies were intended to induce employers to provide ex-
oenders a fair chance. In response to these public BTB laws and social pressure, major
national corporations such as the Home Depot, American Airline, and Koch Group voluntarily
removed the box on their employment applications. Because BTB laws likely provide
ex-oenders fairer employment opportunities, we focus on the net eect of BTB on one-year
rates of recidivism in a county.
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4.3 Data
4.3.1 Rates of Recidivism
We use prison term records of NCRP for oenders released during the period 2000-2014
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2016). The NCRP compiles oender-level data on admissions
and releases voluntarily provided by states.3 Until recent years, NCRP was comprised of a
year-by-year accounting of prison admission, releases, and prison stocks. BJS recently linked
individual oenders with multiple prison terms by using inmate ID, date of birth, admission,
release, and oense and sentencing information in the NCRP data (Laullen et al, 2014; Yang,
2016). Because Yang (2016) documents the extensive steps of data cleaning for the NCRP
2000-2013 dataset, we follow her methods to construct our analysis sample.
The data contain information on the prison admission and release dates for each prison
term. Oender characteristics include race, ethnicity, gender, age, education, and type of
oense. We set age at the date of the rst observed prison release so that all oender
characteristics are time-invariant through the sample period.
We make six sample selection restrictions. First, we include only the rst observed prison
term for each oender to investigate the impact of BTB law on the rst return to prison.
Second, we exclude oenders whose county of incarceration is missing. Third, we exclude
oenders whose prison release dates are missing.4 Fourth, we exclude observations whose
prison release date is prior to 2000. Fifth, we exclude observations whose reason of prison
release is death. Finally, we exclude oenders who were older (younger) than sixty-ve
(eighteen) years old. After imposing these sample selections, we have a total of 4,139,415
oenders released from prison in the sample period 2000-2014. We call this group working
age (age 18-65) ex-oenders.
3States participating in the NCRP has increased from 38 states in 2000 to 48 in 2013 (Yang, 2016).
4Appendix Table ?? shows a list of states that provided the information on dates of oender's release in
NCRP data.
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We also investigate the eect on BTB policy on recidivism for age 25-34 ex-oenders.
We focus on this group for two reasons: First, existing research uses age 25-34 population as
a primary age group of interest (Doleac and Hansen, 2016). Second, 60 percent of criminal
oenders were age 30 or younger in 2012 (Kearney et al. 2014) and employers are most
reluctant to hire those who were recently incarcerated (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 2007),
so the eect of BTB policy is expected to be least pronounced for this group even if BTB
policy works. We label this group as young (age 25-34) ex-oenders.
NCRP also contains information on the county in which each sentence was imposed. The
criminology literature on criminal mobility suggests that the county of sentencing is likely
the oender's county of residence prior to incarceration (Wiles and Costello, 2000; Bernasco
et al, 2013). Oenders on parole are required to return to and reside in the original county
or last county of residence (Raphael and Weiman, 2007; Sabol, 2007; Schnepel, 2016; Yang,
2016). Following existing studies and assuming that the county in which the oender was
released from prison is that in which he/she remained, we use a sentencing county as a unit of
analysis. However, one limitation of the NCRP data is, because BJS only links oenders who
return to custody within a state, we cannot distinguish oenses committed by ex-oenders
moving from other states from those committed by rst-time oenders (Yang, 2016).5
The outcome variable in our analysis is one-year rate of recidivism, dened as a return
to prison in a year in the same state due to a `court commitment' or technical parole
violation (Yang, 2016). BJS denes recidivism as criminal acts that result in the rearrest,
reconviction, or return to prison with or without a new sentence during a period of three years
following the prisoner's release" (Schnepel, 2016). Because our data does not include neither
arrest nor conviction information, we use returning to prison as denition of recidivism.6
5Approximately ten percent of the ex-oenders released in 30 states during 2005 were arrested in another
state (Durose, Snyder, and Cooper, 2015; Yang, 2016 ). Doleac and Hansen (2017) nd little evidence that
BTB policy is associated with a change in demographic composition and an increase in migration into and
out of labor market aected by BTB policy.
6This denition is commonly used in existing studies. Note that the three-year rate of return-to-prison
recidivism in Table 4.1 is lower than the three-year rate of rearrest recidivism. For example, United States
Department of Justice (2017) reports that approximately two-thirds of ex-oenders are rearrested within
three years of release.
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Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for oenders released from their rst sentence.7
The rst (last) two columns report means and standard deviations for working age (young)
ex-oenders. Panel A and B present summary statistics at the ex-oenders' level and
year-county level. The rst three rows of Panel A report the unconditional probabilities
of returning to prison within one, two, and three years for the oenders after their rst
prison release. Because we restrict the sample to the rst release per oender, these rates
of recidivism are not aected by the ex-oenders who recidividate more than one time. 14
and 26 percent of working age ex-oenders return to prison within one and three year(s) of
release.8 Among oenders released in 42 states, 48 percent are White, 36 percent are Black,
and 17 percent are Hispanic. The average age at the time of prison release is 34 years old.
The proportion of residents whose education level is less than high school graduation is 33
percent. The average sentence is a little more than two years.9 When classied by the type
of oense associated with an oender's imprisonment, all of three oense represent about
27 percent for working-age ex-oenders whereas drug oense represents slightly more than
violent and property oense for young ex-oenders.
To control for labor market condition, demographic characteristics, and labor demand, we
aggregate the oender-level data by county-year. Specically, for a given county and year, we
divide the number of prisoners who were released and recidivated within one, two and three
years, by the total number of prisoners released. We collect county-year characteristics from
various sources: unemployment rates from Local Area Unemployment Statistics; proportions
of male, residents whose education level is less than or equal to high school graduates, White,
Black, and Hispanic from American Community Survey and Decennial Census; and new hires
in manufacturing & construction industries and all other industries from Quarterly Workforce
Indicators. We then match all the county characteristics with each county-year cohort using
7Appendix Table ?? tabulates the states and years available in our analysis dataset.
8These rates of recidivism are similar to those using the older version of NCRP data (Yang, 2016). Rhodes
et al. (2014) document that about two-thirds of prisoners released will never return to prison. The gure is
comparable to our rates of recidivism.
9The average sentence is slightly shorter than three years reported by Schnepel (2016). Schnepel uses the
California data of NCRP 1993-2009.
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the MSA county crosswalk of National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).10 Panel B
of Table 4.1 reports descriptive statistics at the county-year level. The numbers of counties
and unique counties are 31,192 (29,378) and 2,709 (2,683) for working age (young) oenders
released. Rates of recidivism and most county characteristics are comparable across age
groups except for new hires.
4.3.2 Ban the Box Laws
We analyze BTB policies eective for a period of January 2000 - December 2014, the available
data period of NCRP. We collect information on the timing and details of BTB policy
from Doleac and Hansen (2016) and Rodriguez and Avery (2017). Following Doleac and
Hansen's BTB adoption date assignment rule, we use the date as the start date of BTB
policy if information about a policy's eective date is available. If it is not, we then use the
date when the policy was announced or passed by legislature. If only the year (month) of
implementation is available, we use January 1st of that year (the rst day of that month) as
the start date.
Adoption of BTB policy may be non-random and cause sorting. Doleac and Hansen
(2017) document that the larger fraction of the residents in communities that eventually
adopt BTB policies is Black, is young and male, and has a college degree on average. Doleac
and Hansen (2017) also detect little discernible evidence that BTB adoption is correlated
with intra-state, inter-state, and within-county migration for four demographic groups, ruling
out the possibility that BTB adoption induces sorting in the local labor market and counties.
Furthermore, the timing of BTB policy adoption is likely to be associated with local interest
in hiring those with criminal records (Doleac and Hansen, 2016), so it may overestimate the
eect of BTB law on recidivism. To mitigate a systematic increase in local labor demand
for returning citizens, we include the number of new hires in the right-hand-side variables
10The MSA county crosswalk is available from the NBER webpage http://www.nber.org/data/
cbsa-msa-fips-ssa-county-crosswalk.html.
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(Schnepel, 2016; Yang, 2016), and, additionally, conduct a falsication test to check if such
unobserved elements threaten an identication of the parameter of interest.
Our goal is to measure the eect of BTB on rates of recidivism in the economy, so we
assign treatment at the county level. Following Doleac and Hansen (2016), we consider
counties treated by BTB if the state in which the county is located has a BTB policy, or if
any jurisdiction in the county has a BTB policy. Figure 4.3 shows counties that we considered
being in eect of BTB law in 2014. We leverage the variations in timing of implementing
BTB laws across counties for identication.11
Table 4.2 reports the number of states and counties by year of BTB policy adoption. The
rst and last four columns correspond to the samples of working-age and young oenders
released. No state adopted BTB policy prior 2008 and, since then, one or two state(s)
has(have) implemented BTB policy year by year (column 1 and 5). Similarly, the number of
counties that implemented BTB policy has rapidly increased since 2005 (column 2 and 6) and
the number of counties that have not adopted BTB has declined (column 3 and 7). Column
4 and 8 report the number of counties that never implemented BTB law over our sample
period.12 In total, we have 491 (485) unique counties that adopted BTB in any year and
2,218 (2,198) unique counties that never adopted BTB for working age (young) oenders.
For brevity, we call counties that have already adopted BTB law BTB adopters" (column
2 and 6), counties that have not adopted it yet or never adopted it non-BTB counties"
(column 3-4 and 7-8), and counties that adopted BTB policy in any year BTB counties"
(column 2-3 and 6-7).
11Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show that the counties used for our analysis are slightly less than those actually in
eect of BTB law mainly owing to voluntarily participation of NCRP.




We employ a DID approach to identify the eect of BTB policy on rate of recidivism.
Temporal variation in rate of recidivism and county characteristics may confound the eect
of BTB policy. To partial out these confounding factors from eect of BTB policy, we
estimate the equation
Recidivismct = α0 + α1BTBct +X
′
ctα2 + αt + αc + αct+ εct, (4.1)
where recidivismct is the one-year rate of recidivism in county c at year t and X ′ct is a
set of county characteristics that account for variation in recidivism (i.e., unemployment
rate, fraction of male, White, Black, and Hispanic population, fraction of residents whose
education level is less than or equal to high school graduation, and number of new hires in
manufacturing & construction and other industries per a thousand working-age population).
We also add year xed eects αt, county xed eects αc, and county-specic linear time
trends αct, and εct is the error term. Robust standard errors clustered at county level are
presented.13
BTBct is an indicator variable that equals one in the BTB adoption year t if the
jurisdiction adopted BTB policy between January 2 and January 31. BTBct rst takes
a value of one in the year t+1 if the BTB policy was rst adopted in January 1 or between
February 1 and December 31 of the year. Recall that we assign January 1 to any counties
whose BTB adoption dates are unknown. To mitigate the potential bias caused by this
assignment rule, we give treatment to only counties which adopted BTB in the beginning of
the adoption year (January 2 - 31) in the adoption year and to other counties in the following
13Researchers should use bootstrap standard errors when the number of cluster is less than 50 (Bertrand
et al. 2004; Cameron et al. 2008).
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year.14 We will also present the results when we assign all BTB adopters treatment in their
BTB adoption years in the robustness check section.
Our counterfactual setting that we have in mind is the average rate of recidivism in
BTB counties would evolve similarly in non-BTB counties over the sample period if no
jurisdiction implemented BTB policy. This setting gives us an equivalent parallel trend
assumption, necessary for identication of parameter of interest. For example, if the county
implemented BTB law due to the time-varying social mood that integrates ex-prisoners
into the local community and that simultaneously reduces the rate of recidivism, it would
confound the eect of BTB policy. In addition, as Doleac and Hansen (2016, 2017) document,
states which adopted BTB policies have more Black and college-educated population with
higher earnings. Because counties that adopted BTB may be dierent from those that did
not, we test if the trends in the rate of recidivism prior to BTB adoption is signicantly
dierent across BTB and non-BTB counties. Furthermore, recall that BTB counties adopt
the private and contract BTB laws after the implementation of the public BTB law. To
capture dynamics of BTB policy, we replace the BTB indicator variable with leads and lags










where BTBc,t−q and BTBc,t+q are indicator variables for four years or more than four years
prior to adoption, 3-1 years before adoption, 0-1 years after adoption, and year 2 and forward.
Any signicant coecient estimates on leads indicates potential violation of the parallel trend
assumption.
14For example, Muskegon county of Michigan adopted BTB in January 12, 2012, so we set Muskegon
to be treated by BTB in 2012. There are only two eective counties, Muskegon county of Michigan and
Hillsborough county of Florida, whose jurisdiction adopted BTB between January 2 and January 31.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 BTB and Recidivism
We start by addressing our main research question: Does BTB policy aect recidivism?
Table 4.3 presents the point estimates of BTB policy from equation 1. Column 1 - 3
(column 4 - 6) correspond to the results for a sample of working-age (young) ex-oenders.
We control for only year and county xed eects (column 1 and 4), add a set of county
characteristics (column 2 and 5), and include county-specic linear time trend (column 3
and 6). We present the average rates of recidivism prior to BTB adoption at the top of each
column. Estimates of the eects of BTB policies on rates of recidivism are signicant and
negative across all specications. Our main specication in column 3 and 6 demonstrates an
adoption of BTB law reduces recidivism by 5.7 percentage points (29%) and 4.7 percentage
points (24%). These eects are substantial relative to the mean of pre-BTB adoption. The
estimated impact of BTB policy is smaller in magnitude for the group of younger ex-oenders,
partially reecting the fact that age-prole of criminal oenders is concentrated at their early
adulthood.
We have evidence suggesting that BTB policy reduces recidivism, but our discrete model
does not allow us to capture the dynamics of BTB policy. To this end, we replace the BTB
indicator variable in equation 4.1 with lags of BTB implementation - one and two years
after adoption and year 3 onward. We report estimates from this model in Table 4.4. We
observe a similar pattern in statistical signicance, but it appears that the eect of BTB law
for the working-age ex-oenders increases over time upon implementation. The results from
column 3 report that in the rst year of adoption BTB policy reduces recidivism by only 3.4
percentage points and intensies in magnitude to 7.4-8.1 percentage points in the following
years. The pattern of the estimates for the sample of young ex-oenders is similar whereas
the point estimates of the rst year adoption is imprecisely estimated.
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The growing eects may be related to the role-model eect of public BTB policy or lack
of information shared on the labor supply sides. Recall that public BTB law was adopted
so that private rms could follow the best practice in hiring (Doleac and Hansen, 2016).
The eect might have grown over time as more private rms voluntarily removed the box
from their application forms. National chains may have been persuaded to exclude the box
entirely due to the need to comply with a list of state and local BTB law (Agan and Starr,
2017). Alternatively, ex-oenders might not know their rights under BTB law. Indeed, few
complaints against employers have been submitted to the District's Oce of Human Resource
one year after adoption (Berracasa et al, 2016), suggesting that people with criminal records
may not be aware of their rights (Stacy and Cohen, 2017). Exploring how these channels
are contributed to the accelerating eect of BTB policy is crucial for policy planning, but it
is beyond the scope of our research to measure the eect of such diusing information.
We next examine the internal validity of our research design. Our DID approach hinges
on the parallel trend assumption, where BTB and non-BTB jurisdictions would have similar
trends in rates of recidivism over the same period if they did not adopt BTB law. To verify
if this assumption holds, we estimate equation 4.2. Figure 4.4 and 4.5 depict the trends of
rates of recidivism for working-age and young ex-oenders by excluding an indicator variable
for one year before adoption. Vertical bands represent 95 percent condence intervals. The
coecient estimates on lead terms are close to zero and insignicant. As reported in Table
4.4, the pattern of our estimates show an accelerating eect of BTB law on recidivism.
Table 4.5 presents the results for working-age and young ex-oenders along with those from
a sample of age 18-40 (18-50) ex-oenders. The estimated eects on lead terms are not
dierent from zero at the conventional level. On the whole, we do not nd any evidence that




We have shown the results of pooling all the data of ex-oenders into county-level rates of
recidivism. Employing our preferred specication and aggregating the data of particular
groups of ex-oenders into the rates of recidivism, we next investigate whether particular
types of ex-oenders dierently responded to BTB policy. Panel A and B of Table 4.6 present
the coecient estimates for samples of working-age and young ex-oenders respectively. We
report the average one-year rates of recidivism for each group at the top of each column.
The rst two columns of Table 4.6 show the coecient estimates of BTB policy on
recidivism by gender. We nd a similar pattern of point estimates for males but do not
nd any discernible evidence that females benet from BTB law. Specically, BTB reduces
recidivism by 6.2 percentage points (30%) for working-age male ex-oenders, although the
estimated eect of BTB policy is merely 2.3 percentage points and highly insignicant for
female ex-oenders. We nd the similar results by race and ethnicity. White and Black
oenders released benet from BTB but the estimated eect for Hispanic is marginally
signicant. The estimated eect for Black is particularly pronounced. As such, BTB policy
reduces 10.9 percentage points (45%) in recidivism for working-age Black oenders released
and 10.4 percentage points (48%) for young oenders. These results are consistent with the
fact that states with BTB policy have more Black residents (Doleac and Hansen, 2016) and
the nding that Black men benet but women do not on net employment rate from BTB
policy (Shoag and Veuger, 2016).
We also report the estimated eects of BTB policy by crime type (column 6-8). There
are no noticeable dierences in the eect of BTB on recidivism by dierent crime types.
It implies that BTB laws uniformly deter recidivism regardless of crime type committed.
Finally, we take the median of the proportion of residents whose education level is equal
to or less than high school graduation, and divide the counties into two groups - counties
with the less than or equal to (more than) the median. Namely, counties in a group of `less
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than or equal to the median' are high education counties. The last two columns of Table
4.6 present the point estimates on recidivism by education (column 9 and 10). We nd
that BTB has a larger reduction in rates of recidivism for working age ex-oenders in the
high education counties (column 9 of Panel A) whereas it has no discernible eect for young
ex-oenders (column 9 of Panel B). States with BTB policies have more college-educated
and high income residents (Doleac and Hansen, 2016) and young oenders tend to take part
in risky activities and be associated with criminals (Heller et al., 2017). Crime may increase
if an improvement in labor market conditions is associated with an increase in opportunities
to steal (Cantor and Land, 1985; Freedman and Owens, 2016; Schnepel 2016). The pattern
of these estimates may be explained by a combination of behavioral factors and increased
returns to crime associated with increases in community income.
4.5.3 Trade-o and Mechanism
Our analysis so far reveals rich dierential responses to BTB policy by groups. Motivated by
these ndings, we rst extend our analysis to explore how BTB policies aected labor markets
for working age and young population. BTB policy is intended to improve employment
opportunities for those with criminal records. However, employers statistically discriminate
against demographic groups that are more likely to have a criminal record when an applicant's
criminal history is unavailable (Agan and Starr, 2016; Doleac and Hansen, 2016). Following
the Doleac and Hansen's (2016) research and using Current Population Survey (CPS) data
available at National Bureau of Economic Research, we estimate a variant of their statistical
discrimination model over a period of 2000-2014.1516 Robust standard errors clustered at
states are reported.
15A few dierences in our specication to Doleac and Hansen's one are our unit of BTB adoption is a
county (theirs is Metropolitan Statistical Area), our sample consists of age 18-65 and age 25-34 workers
(theirs consist of 25-34 males), and our sample period is 2000-2014 (theirs is 2004-2014). Consequently, our
sample size diers from Doleac and Hansen's.
16As noted in the footnote of Doleac and Hansen (2016), we conrmed that about half of CPS respondents
are matched to counties.
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We report estimates for working age population and young population in Panels A and
B of Table 4.7. Although there are some dierences in specication and sample composition,
we obtain point estimates of BTB policy on employment probability comparable to those
of Doleac and Hansen (2016). For example, BTB is associated with a reduction in average
probability that Black workers without college degrees are employed by 3.5-4.0 percentage
points (5.8%-6%) (column 4 of Panel A and B). These results combined with existing evidence
indicate that BTB has unintentionally done harm to a particular group of job seekers (Agan
and Starr, 2016; Doleac and Hansen, 2016).
This labor market analysis poses a question: what is the eect of employment opportunities
- particularly in the industry which employs more ex-oenders - following the BTB policy
adoption on recidivism? Existing studies nd that an employment opportunity in low-skilled
jobs in a county of release decreases rate of recidivism (Schnepel 2016; Yang 2016). Borrowing
Schnepel's nding that an increase in new hires in manufacturing & construction industries





where NewHiresict is the number of new hires in industry i per one thousand working-age
persons. Industries are all industries, manufacturing & construction, or all other industries.
The rst (last) two columns of Table 4.8 present the point estimates of new hires and
its interaction with the BTB indicator variable on recidivism for working age (young) ex-
oenders. Panel A shows the results obtained from number of new hires in all industries. The
estimated eect of new hires in all industries is very small in magnitude and not statistically
dierent from zero (column 1, panel A). Similarly the estimated coecient on the interaction
term is highly insignicant (column 2, Panel A). The pattern of the estimated coecients
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for young ex-oenders is practically identical. As Schnepel (2016) documents, changes in
aggregate labor demand appear to have little eect on recidivism even in BTB counties.
We next sort all industries into manufacturing & construction industries and all other
industries. Panel B of Table 4.8 presents the results from this exercise. Analysis by
disaggregation reveals that an increase in new hires in manufacturing & construction industries
is signicantly associated with a decrease in recidivism (column 1, panel B). We further
include interaction terms with a BTB indicator variable and new hires in each industries to
allow the eects to dier depending on whether jurisdictions adopted BTB policy. We nd
a modest and statistically signicant decrease (increase) in recidivism is associated with an
increase in new hires in manufacturing & construction (all other) industries following the
adoption of BTB. Specically, 0.17 (0.02) percentage points decrease (increase) in recidivism
is associated with one extra manufacturing & construction (all other industries) hire per one
thousand working-age persons in a county after BTB policy is in eect (column 2, Panel
B). Turning to young ex-oenders, we nd that the eects of new hires in each industry
are amplied following BTB adoption. That is, a similar increase in manufacturing &
construction (all other industries) hires is associated with a 0.6 (0.06) percentage point
decrease (increase) in recidivism (column 4, Panel B). Relative to the BTB preadoption
mean of recidivism, a similar change in manufacturing & construction (all other industries)
hire is associated with a reduction (an increase) in one-year recidivism by 3.1% (0.3%). To
put this into perspective, our estimated eect of new hires in manufacturing & construction
after the BTB adoption is twice the observed eect in new hires in California's manufacturing
industry (Schnepel 2016) and one-third the eect of eligibility for welfare (Yang, 2017).
4.5.4 Robustness Check
In Table 4.9 we test if our main results are robust. First we check if the timing of BTB
adoption matters. Recall the BTB indicator variable in our main specication takes a value
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of one, for example, in 2010 (in 2011) and onward if a jurisdiction adopts BTB policy
from Jan 2 to Jan 31, 2010 (on January 1, 2010 or any dates between February 1 and
December 31, 2010). We replace it with the BTB indicator variable taking a value of one
in 2010 and onward if a jurisdiction adopted BTB policy anytime in 2010. The results
using this alternative indicator variable are presented in column 1 of Table 4.9. Note that
the estimated eects on recidivism are smaller than those reported in Table 4.3 (column
3 and 6). To investigate dierence in magnitude, we estimate the dynamic eect model in
Table 4.4 with these alternative BTB indicator variables. Unsurprisingly, consistent with the
results from Table 4.4, we only nd large and signicant second and third year eects in our
main specication. As such, the second and third post-adoption eects of BTB are 3.6 and
8.0 percentage points decreases in rate of recidivism and signicant at conventional levels
(column 3, Table ??). Table ?? reports the results from the falsication test with this BTB
treatment indicator variable.17 Taken together, if anything, we nd these point estimates in
column 1 reect a dierence in the eects of BTB policy in the rst and following year(s) of
adoption.
Second, recall that we consider a county treated by BTB if a city encompassed by the
county has BTB policy. Figure 4.6 depicts a map of Hennepin county and Minneapolis
showing this relationship. Hennepin county which covers other areas is considered to be
treated because Minneapolis adopted BTB policy in 2006, and such BTB adoption rule may
underestimate the eect of BTB policy. Excluding these counties barely alter the estimates
(column 2). Third, our measure of one-year rate of recidivism in 2014 may be contaminated
owing to right-censoring. For example, an ex-oender released on December 1, 2014 may
return to prison any date between Jan 1 and November 30, 2015, but our one-year rate of
recidivism for the year 2014 does not count this ex-oender. To examine if this is a threat for
robustness, we exclude all counties in 2014 to see whether the last year of the sample period
17In appendix Table Table ??, we provide the results from falsication test using this BTB indicator.
We do not observe any sign for discernible trends in recidivism for young ex-oenders, but we do observe
statistically signicant pre-treatment trends for working-age ex-oenders.
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drives the negative eect. The results remain intact (column 3). Fourth, recall January 1 of
a year is set as the start date if only the year of BTB implementation is available (Doleac and
Hansen, 2016). To rule out the possibility that these counties are inuential observations,
we drop counties which are set to implement BTB policy in January 1. The eect of BTB
policy is slightly larger in magnitude, but still consistent with those for the entire sample
(column 4).
Fifth, to test if regional macroeconomic factors aect the eect of BTB policy, we include
region by year xed eects in our model (column 5). It is reassuring that the estimates remain
unchanged. Finally, we report the association of BTB policy to two- and three-year rates
of recidivism (column 6 and 7). Note that the pre-treatment mean of the rate of recidivism
presented in the top of each column increases as a year elapses from two to three. Irrespective
of analysis population, the estimated eects contract as the duration for which ex-oenders
are allowed to recidivate widens. For example, BTB is associated with a 21.7% (14.7%)
decrease in two-year (three-year) rates of recidivism (column 6 and 7, Panel A). Although
caution must be warranted to interpret these results due to right-censoring on two- and
three-year rates of recidivism, these estimates reinforce our main nding that BTB policies
reduce recidivism.
4.6 Policy Discussion
Throughout this paper we present evidence that BTB policies reduced one-year rates of
recidivism. Although we cannot disentangle the eects of the role-model eect of public
BTB policy and lack of information shared on the labor supply sides, the eect of BTB
policies appears to grow following its implementation. Our nding resembles that the eect
of BTB policies on Black male employment is large and grow over time (Doleac and Hansen,
2016). Recall also that BTB policies reduce recidivism for Black male oenders released but
have no discernible eect on recidivism for female ex-oenders. Consistent with Shoag and
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Veuger (2016), these results indicate that BTB policies disproportionately benet Black male
ex-oenders over females. Our subgroup analysis by county education level also reveals that
BTB policy benets working-age ex-oenders but does not show any evidence of beneting
young ex-oenders. Potential explanations may be related to a combination of behavioral
factors (e.g., young ex-oenders have a tendency to associate with criminals) and increased
returns to crime associated with increases in community wealth.
These results motivate us to extend Doleac and Hansen's (2016) research to investigate
the eect of BTB policy on employment probability of minority workers for our age groups of
interest. As documented by Doleac and Hansen, BTB policy reduces Black male employment
signicantly. This result coupled with our ndings leads us to a conclusion that BTB
policy is a double-edged sword". We further investigate the interactive eect of BTB and
local employment opportunities on recidivism. We nd that employment opportunities in
manufacturing & construction industries reduce recidivism, and the eect is particularly
amplied for young ex-oenders.
To translate these estimates into the eect of BTB policy in terms of returning citizens,
we perform a straightforward back-of-envelope calculation. There are approximately 62,000
prisoners released from BTB state prisons in 2014 (Carson, 2015).18 Our estimated eect
of BTB policy is a 29% reduction in one-year rate of recidivism. There would be a total of
17,980 (62,000×(-0.29)) working-age ex-oenders who would not return to prison within one
year. Thus, our results indicate that BTB policy prevents ex-oenders from recidivating.
We also perform a similar calculation for the impact of employment opportunities in
BTB states. New hires in manufacturing & construction industries upon BTB adoption
are associated with a reduction in recidivism by 0.9%. There would be a total of 5,580
(0.009×62,000) working-age ex-oenders who would not recidivate within one year. The
average annual cost per inmate is 41,000 dollars in 2010 value (Henrichson and Delaney,
18The nest level of granularity in the number of ex-oenders released in a year is state. BTB states in
2014 are CA, CO, NE, MN, MA, and RI in our analysis sample. Table 7 of Carson (2015) allows us to
calculate a total of 61,875 prisoners released in 2014 in these six BTB states.
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2012).19 Hence, the estimated reduction in annual correctional spending is 228 million
dollars in 2010 value. Given the operation cost for federal and state prison is 80 billion
dollars (Picchi, 2014), a scal policy to expand employment opportunities in manufacturing
& construction industries accompanied with BTB policies reduces a 0.3 % reduction in the
operational cost, indicating that it is an eective way to reduce recidivism.
4.7 Conclusion
BTB policies have been adopted by dierent levels of jurisdictions to support fair employment
opportunities for citizens with criminal histories. The number of BTB jurisdictions exceeds
100 and 12 states have active BTB law in 2014. Despite the widespread adoption of BTB
laws, the empirical evidence is concentrated in statistical discrimination literature and few
studies have been devoted to studying the eect of BTB on recidivism - returning citizens
that BTB policies are intended to work for. Under the assumption that the average rate
of recidivism in BTB counties would evolve similarly in non-BTB counties over the sample
period if no jurisdiction implemented BTB policy, our DID approach teases out the causal
eects of BTB policy. Using a large-scale NCRP dataset and extracting variation in the
timing of BTB adoption for a period of 2000-2014, we obtain a set of empirical results
applicable to public policy.
We nd a large and signicant eect of BTB on recidivism and the eect of BTB policy
grows over time. We also observe that male Black ex-oenders benet from BTB policy
but female ex-oenders may not. Additionally, we do not detect a signicant reduction in
recidivism for young ex-oenders in highly educated counties, suggesting that this result
may be related to a combination of behavioral factors and an increase in return to crime
19BTB states in our 2014 sample are CA, CO, NE, MN, MA, and RI in 2014. Figure 2 of Henrichson and
Delaney (2012) allows us to calculate 40,848 dollars as the average annual cost per inmate. Note that the
annual cost per inmate is not available in MA.
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in high income neighborhoods. Furthermore, we conrm that BTB laws induce employers
to statistically discriminate against Black males. Finally, an increase in new employment
opportunities in industries which hire more young ex-oenders upon BTB adoption is associated
with a 3.1% reduction in recidivism.
From a public policy standpoint, BTB policy is a double-edged sword. It hurts Black
male workers with and without any criminal records but benets those recently released
from prison. An important takeaway from our analysis is BTB policy coupled with scal
policy targeting job creation in particular industries (e.g., manufacturing and construction
industries) is an eective way to help ex-oenders return to society.
74
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Released Oenders and Counties 2000-
2014
Age 18-65 Age 25-34
Panel A: Oender Characteristics Mean SD Mean SD
One Year Recidivism 0.137 0.343 0.132 0.338
Two Year Recidivism 0.219 0.414 0.215 0.411
Three Year Recidivism 0.264 0.441 0.262 0.440
White 0.476 0.499 0.466 0.499
Black 0.363 0.481 0.353 0.478
Hispanic 0.172 0.378 0.195 0.396
Male 0.867 0.339 0.858 0.349
Age at Prison Release 34.020 10.304 29.642 2.881
< High School Graduation 0.333 0.471 0.333 0.471
Sentence Length (years) 2.141 3.224 2.006 2.418
Violent 0.266 0.442 0.270 0.444
Property 0.274 0.446 0.262 0.440
Drug 0.286 0.452 0.305 0.460
Sample Size 4139415 1444741
Panel B: County Characteristics (County-Year)
Outcome variables
One Year Recidivism 0.127 0.126 0.127 0.161
Two Year Recidivism 0.205 0.157 0.211 0.201
Three Year Recidivism 0.247 0.171 0.257 0.217
Control Variables
Unemployment Rate 0.068 0.029 0.068 0.029
Proportion of male 0.501 0.021 0.501 0.021
Proportion of ≤ High School Graduation 0.535 0.112 0.535 0.113
Proportion of White 0.872 0.146 0.869 0.145
Proportion of Black 0.081 0.132 0.084 0.133
Proportion of Hispanic 0.077 0.122 0.078 0.123
New hires in manuf&const (per 1000) 3.606 11.718 1.106 3.493
New hires in other industries (per 1000) 23.062 84.109 7.117 26.447
Sample Size 31192 29378
Number of Counties 2709 2683
Source: National Corrections Reporting Program, 2000-2014 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2016), Local Area Unemployment Statistics, American Community Survey
2009-2014, and Decennial Census 2000 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017), and
Quarterly Workforce Indicators 2000-2014 (United States Bureau of Census, 2017)
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Table 4.2: State and County BTB Adoption
Age 18-65 Age 25-34



























Year of Adoption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000 0 0 414 740 0 0 368 714
2001 0 0 434 1047 0 0 384 995
2002 0 0 432 1291 0 0 392 1228
2003 0 0 441 1308 0 0 400 1255
2004 0 0 443 1305 0 0 405 1251
2005 0 2 438 1586 0 2 405 1510
2006 0 4 440 1756 0 4 407 1681
2007 0 8 436 1813 0 8 395 1736
2008 0 10 434 1825 0 10 396 1732
2009 1 94 353 1908 1 79 327 1813
2010 2 150 292 1957 2 143 266 1856
2011 0 176 284 2046 0 170 267 1940
2012 1 242 227 2148 1 223 202 1999
2013 1 253 186 2086 1 236 177 1971
2014 1 326 0 1857 1 288 0 1743
Total States
/ Counties




491 2218 485 2198
Notes: The sample includes all years starting over a period of 2000-2014. Columns (1) and (5) refer to states adopting BTB law at any year over the
sample period. Columns (2)-(3) and (6)-(7) refer to counties of which jurisdictions were adopting BTB law at any year. See text for further details.
Table 4.3: The Estimated Impact of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year
Age 18-65 Age 25-34
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.190 0.190 0.190
BTB -0.074*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.067*** -0.047***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County Linear Trend No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.404 0.406 0.499 0.297 0.299 0.400
Sample Size 31192 31192 31192 29378 29378 29378
Notes: BTB stands for Ban the Box. The dependent variable is annual rate of recidivism within
a county. Ordinary least squares estimates are presented. Huber-White robust standard errors
clustered at counties allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each county. * 0.10, ** 0.05
and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
Table 4.4: Dynamic Eects of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year
Age 18-65 Age 25-34
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Year Postadoption -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.035*** -0.025
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
2nd Year Postadoption -0.085*** -0.079*** -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.079*** -0.065***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018)
3rd Year and Forward -0.088*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.070***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County Linear Trend No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.405 0.407 0.500 0.297 0.299 0.400
Sample Size 31192 31192 31192 29378 29378 29378
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at counties allow for arbitrary correlation of
residuals within each county. See notes of table 4.3 and the text for further detials. * 0.10, ** 0.05
and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
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Table 4.5: Eects of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year by Years
Elapsed from Adoption
Age
18-65 18-40 18-50 25-34
BTB law leads and lags: (1) (2) (3) (4)
4th Year and More Prior 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.014
(0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
3rd Year Prior 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.022
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
2nd Year Prior -0.005 -0.013 -0.014 0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
1st Year Prior - Omitted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
1st Year Postadoption -0.032** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.018
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017)
2nd Year Postadoption -0.073*** -0.094*** -0.085*** -0.060***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019)
3rd Year and Forward -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.088*** -0.068***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes





t3 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.500 0.476 0.493 0.400
Sample Size 31192 30776 31055 29378
Notes: Year prior to BTB law adoption is the omitted category. BTB Law change
indicators (3rd Year Prior - 2nd Year Postadoption) are equal to one in only one
year each per adopting county. 4th Year and More Prior (3rd Year and Forward)
indicator variables are equal to one in every year beginning with the fourth year




Table 4.6: Heterogeneous Eects of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year
Gender Race/Ethnicity Crime Type ≤ High School Grad
Male Female White Black Hispanic Violent Property Drug ≤ Median > Median
Panel A: Age 18-65 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.203 0.143 0.193 0.244 0.162 0.210 0.240 0.150 0.194 0.195
BTB -0.062*** -0.023 -0.060*** -0.109*** -0.034* -0.088*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.087*** -0.051***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.031) (0.011)
R2 0.486 0.349 0.454 0.434 0.410 0.390 0.403 0.378 0.442 0.546
Sample Size 31097 26273 30893 21957 16821 29091 29304 28312 16188 15004
Panel B: Age 25-34
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.194 0.166 0.197 0.216 0.150 0.208 0.232 0.148 0.194 0.195
BTB -0.057*** -0.005 -0.066*** -0.104*** -0.042* -0.063*** -0.053** -0.059*** -0.030 -0.047***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.041) (0.016)
R2 0.382 0.368 0.379 0.434 0.440 0.350 0.355 0.354 0.343 0.455
Sample Size 29115 21402 28451 18180 12963 24507 25378 24660 15221 14157
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The model specications are identical to those in the column (3) and (6) of table 4.3. Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at counties
allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each county. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
Table 4.7: The Estimated Impact of the BTB Law on Employment 2000-14.
Panel A: Age 18-65 with No College Degree
Pre-Treatment Mean (1) (2) (3) (4)
White 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.716
Black 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605
Hispanic 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.661
BTB -0.052*** -0.039*** 0.004 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005)
BTB × Black -0.098*** -0.035** -0.041*** -0.035***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
BTB × Hispanic -0.010 -0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
R2 0.017 0.077 0.080 0.081
Sample Size 2986246 2986246 2986246 2986246
Panel B: Age 25-35 with No College Degree
Pre-Treatment Mean
White 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752
Black 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664
Hispanic 0.719 0.719 0.719 0.719
BTB -0.053*** -0.040** 0.004 0.008
(0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010)
BTB × Black -0.110*** -0.039** -0.047*** -0.040***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013)
BTB × Hispanic -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 0.001
(0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
County FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes
Time * Region FEs No No Yes Yes
County-Specic trends No No No Yes
R2 0.020 0.039 0.045 0.048
Sample Size 555325 555325 555325 555325
Notes: Current Population Survey 2000-2014 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017).
Ordinary least squares estimates are presented. Huber-White robust standard errors clustered
at states allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each state. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and ***0.01
denote signicance levels.
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Table 4.8: The Estimated Impact of New Hires on Recidivism within One Year.
Age 18-65 Age 25-34
Panel A: All Industries (1) (2) (3) (4)
Recidivism Mean 0.194 0.194 0.190 0.190
BTB -0.0571*** -0.0547*** -0.0470*** -0.0474***
(0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0150) (0.0167)
New Hires -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
BTB × New Hires -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001)
R2 0.499 0.499 0.400 0.400
Sample Size 31192 31192 29378 29378
Panel B: Construction & Manufacturing
BTB -0.0572*** -0.0560*** -0.0471*** -0.0449***
(0.0105) (0.0117) (0.0150) (0.0171)
Const & Manuf New Hires -0.0006** -0.0004 -0.0018* -0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0010)
All Other New Hires 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002)
BTB × Const & Manuf New Hires -0.0017*** -0.0059**
(0.0006) (0.0026)
BTB × All Other New Hires 0.0002** 0.0006**
(0.0001) (0.0002)
R2 0.499 0.499 0.400 0.400
Sample Size 31192 31192 29378 29378
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: See the text for the detail. Control variables include unemployment rate and proportions of
male, less than high school graduates, White, Black, and Hispanic. Huber-White robust standard
errors clustered at counties allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each county. * 0.10, **
0.05 and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
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Panel A: Age 18-65 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.276 0.311
BTB -0.026*** -0.064*** -0.056*** -0.072*** -0.054*** -0.060*** -0.046***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
R2 0.498 0.496 0.507 0.509 0.502 0.536 0.566
Sample Size 31192 30623 28529 28468 31192 31192 31192
Panel B: Age 25-34
Pre-Treatment Mean 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.275 0.314
BTB -0.027** -0.053*** -0.046*** -0.080*** -0.040*** -0.064*** -0.043**
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
R2 0.399 0.397 0.408 0.413 0.402 0.433 0.453
Sample Size 29378 28809 27020 26871 29378 29378 29378
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Linear Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region by Year FE No No No No Yes No No
Notes: The model specications are identical to those in the column (3) and (6) of table 4.3. * 0.10, ** 0.05 and ***0.01 denote
signicance levels.
Figure 4.1: BTB and non-BTB Counties in 2000.
Figure 4.2: BTB and non-BTB Counties in 2014
Notes: Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show BTB and non-BTB counties in 2000 and 2014. The counties marked purple
are in eect of BTB laws, whereas those marked gray are not. See text for the details.
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Figure 4.3: BTB and non-BTB counties Used for Our Main Analysis in 2014.
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Note: Vertical bands represent |1.96| times the standard error of each point esimate.
Point Estimates and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals
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Note: Vertical bands represent |1.96| times the standard error of each point esimate.
Point Estimates and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals
Figure 4.5: Falsication Test: Age 25-34
Figure 4.6: Hennepin County and Minneapolis
Notes: This gure shows an example of a county encompassing a city jurisdiction which rst adopted BTB.
The gray area represents Hennepin County while the purple area represents Minneapolis
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Chapter 5. Conclusion
I have presented studies related to the recent U.S. society in my dissertation. Unlike my
home country, the U.S. has a dynamic economy, a higher degree of inequality, and racial
division. The U.S. also provides empirical researchers with fairer access to the data. The
three essays presented in my dissertation are solely focused on the U.S. because I am curious
about changes that the U.S. has been going through.
The rst chapter analyzes how the inow of foreign direct investment (FDI) aects
entrepreneurial activities. Separating a pool of contiguous U.S. states into pro- and non pro-
business states identied by Right-to-Work status, we nd that FDI slows down the business
creation and destruction rates in the non-pro business states. The second chapter examines if
the positive benets of breastfeeding reported by observational research is causal. Employing
a newly developed sensitivity check methodology, we nd that decision to breastfeeding
is sensitive to non-random selection into breastfeeding. The third chapter investigates if
Ban-the-box (BTB) policy - the law prohibits employers to ask job applicants' criminal
history on the job application forms - reduces recidivism. We nd that BTB policy reduces
recidivism. We also nd that the employment opportunities in the industries that hire more
ex-oenders upon BTB adoption prevent recidivism.
My research interest lies in the empirical studies related to the U.S. economy and society.
I continue my research activities and provide policy relevant ndings to the society. This is
how I contribute to the society as a scholar.
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Figure 1: US States by RTW Laws and Enactment Years
Figure A.1: States with Right-to-Work Laws
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Appendix B. Six Months Breastfeeding
vs. No Breastfeeding
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Table B.1: Probit and OLS Estimates of Breastfeeding Eects








(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 9 months No health problem (N=8,350)
:Breastfeeding 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.132*** 0.118***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043)
[0.068] [0.073] [0.051] [0.046]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03
Cognitive score (N=8,350)
Breastfeeding 0.070** 0.036 -0.002 -0.007
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
R2 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.06
Panel B: 24 months Normal weight (N=7,350)
:Breastfeeding 0.229*** 0.247*** 0.210*** 0.192***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048)
[0.078] [0.083] [0.070] [0.064]
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
No health problem (N=7,350)
:Breastfeeding 0.008 0.022 0.012 -0.004
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046)
[0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [-0.001]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
Cognitive score (N=7,350)
Breastfeeding 0.262*** 0.218*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
R2 0.02 0.12 0.17 0.18
Panel C: 48 months Normal weight (N=6,650)
:Breastfeeding 0.081* 0.106** 0.037 0.003
(0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
[0.030] [0.038] [0.013] [0.001]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04
No health problem (N=6,600)
:Breastfeeding 0.023 0.033 0.054 0.040
(0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049)
[0.009] [0.013] [0.021] [0.016]
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Cognitive score (N=6,400)
Breastfeeding 0.149*** 0.143*** 0.097*** 0.099***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note. See Table 3.3 for the details.
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Table B.2: Sensitivity of Estimates of Breastfeeding Eects on Health
Outcomes and Cognitive Score to Assumptions about Selection Bias in
ECLS-B
Ever BF vs Never CORRELATION OF DISTURBANCESa




Panel A: 9 months No health problem
:Breastfeeding 0.118 0.035 -0.048 -0.212 -0.246
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
[0.046] [0.014] [-0.019] [-0.081] [-0.094]
Constraint on ρ 0.22
Panel B: 24 months Normal weight
:Breastfeeding 0.188 0.104 0.021 -0.142 -0.008
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
[0.063] [0.035] [0.007] [-0.048] [-0.003]
Constraint on ρ 0.12
Cognitive score
:Breastfeeding 0.087 0.004 -0.079 -0.242 -0.912
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.044)
[0.030] [0.001] [-0.028] [-0.084] [-0.305]
Constraint on ρ 0.61
Panel C: 48 months Cognitive score
:Breastfeeding 0.154 0.070 -0.013 -0.176 -0.379
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048)
[0.054] [0.025] [-0.004] [-0.062] [-0.134]
Constraint on ρ 0.32
Note. See Table 3.4 for the details.
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Table B.3: Amount of Selection on Unobservables Relative to Selection on Observables
Required to Attribute the Entire Breastfeeding Eect to Selection Bias
Ever BF vs Never 9 months 24 months 48 months
No health problem Normal weight Cognitive scorec Cognitive scorec
α̂ 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10
Cov(BF, ε)/V ar(υ̂)a 0.76 0.79 1.01 3.32
Implied ratiob 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.03
Note. See Table 3.5 for the details.
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Appendix C. BTB and Recidivism
100
Table C.1: Dynamic Eects of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year
Age 18-65 Age 25-34
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Year Postadoption -0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
2nd Year Postadoption -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.045*** -0.036*** -0.028
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
3rd Year and Forward -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.092*** -0.081*** -0.073***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
County Linear Trend No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.405 0.407 0.500 0.297 0.299 0.400
Sample Size 31192 31192 31192 29378 29378 29378
Notes: Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at counties allow for arbitrary correlation of
residuals within each county. See notes of table 4.3 and the text for further detials. * 0.10, ** 0.05
and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
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Table C.2: Dynamic Eects of BTB Law on Recidivism within One Year
Age
18-65 18-40 18-50 25-34
BTB law leads and lags: (1) (2) (3) (4)
4th Year and More Prior 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
3rd Year Prior 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.021
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
2nd Year Prior 0.020* 0.028** 0.023** 0.022
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014)
1st Year Prior - Omitted 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
1st Year Postadoption 0.011 0.019 0.020 0.001
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
2nd Year Postadoption -0.019 -0.023 -0.020 -0.016
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
3rd Year and Forward -0.058*** -0.067*** -0.059*** -0.062***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020)
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes





t3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.491 0.469 0.487 0.392
Sample Size 32231 31738 32069 30531
Notes: All models include leads and lags of adoption of BTB laws. BTB Law
change indicators (3rd Year Prior - 2nd Year Postadoption) are equal to one in
only one year each per adopting county or state. 4th Year and More Prior (3rd
Year and Forward) indicator variables are equal to one in every year beginning
with the fourth year after (the third year before) BTB law adoption. * 0.10, **
0.05 and ***0.01 denote signicance levels.
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Table C.3: States Provided the Information on Dates of
Oender's Release in NCRP Data
State Years State Years State Years
AL 2007-2014 MA 2010-2014 OH 2009-2013
AK 2005-2013 MI 2010-2013 OK 2000-2014
AZ 2000-2014 MN 2000-2014 OR 2001-2013
CA 2000-2014 MS 2004-2014 PA 2001-2014
CO 2000-2014 MO 2000-2014 RI 2004-2014
FL 2000-2014 MT 2010-2014 SC 2000-2014
GA 2000-2014 NE 2000-2014 SD 2000-2012
IL 2000-2013 NV 2008-2014 TN 2000-2014
IN 2002-2014 NH 2011-2014 TX 2005-2014
IA 2006-2014 NJ 2003-2013 UT 2000-2014
KS 2011-2014 NM 2004-2014 WA 2000-2014
KY 2000-2014 NY 2000-2014 WV 2000-2014
ME 2012-2014 NC 2000-2014 WI 2000-2014
MD 2000-2014 ND 2002-2014 WY 2006-2014
Notes: This table lists the states and years that are available
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